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Buyer Power and Supplier Relationship Commitment: A Cognitive Evaluation Theory Perspective

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  • Sangho Chae
  • Thomas Y. Choi
  • Daesik Hur

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  • Sangho Chae & Thomas Y. Choi & Daesik Hur, 2017. "Buyer Power and Supplier Relationship Commitment: A Cognitive Evaluation Theory Perspective," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 53(2), pages 39-60, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jscmgt:v:53:y:2017:i:2:p:39-60
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jscm.12138
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2007. "Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 177-181, May.
    3. Stacey R. Finkelstein & Ayelet Fishbach, 2012. "Tell Me What I Did Wrong: Experts Seek and Respond to Negative Feedback," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 39(1), pages 22-38.
    4. James Andreoni & William Harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, 2003. "The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 893-902, June.
    5. Bas Van der Klaauw & Jan C. Van Ours, 2013. "Carrot And Stick: How Re‐Employment Bonuses And Benefit Sanctions Affect Exit Rates From Welfare," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(2), pages 275-296, March.
    6. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2007. "The Effect Of Rewards And Sanctions In Provision Of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 671-690, October.
    7. Regis Terpend & Daniel R. Krause, 2015. "Competition or Cooperation? Promoting Supplier Performance with Incentives Under Varying Conditions of Dependence," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 51(4), pages 29-53, October.
    8. Barbara K. Wichmann & Craig R. Carter & Lutz Kaufmann & Jeffrey R. Wilson, 2016. "Making Environmental SCM Initiatives Work—Moving Beyond the Dyad to Gain Affective Commitment," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 52(1), pages 21-40, January.
    9. Niels J. Pulles & Jasper Veldman & Holger Schiele & Henk Sierksma, 2014. "Pressure or Pamper? The Effects of Power and Trust Dimensions on Supplier Resource Allocation," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 50(3), pages 16-36, July.
    10. Brayden G. King & Teppo Felin & David A. Whetten, 2010. "Perspective---Finding the Organization in Organizational Theory: A Meta-Theory of the Organization as a Social Actor," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 290-305, February.
    11. Herbert C. Kelman, 1958. "Compliance, identification, and internalization three processes of attitude change," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 2(1), pages 51-60, March.
    12. Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-364, May.
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