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Voting Equilibria in Multi‐candidate Elections

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  • JOHN DUGGAN
  • YOJI SEKIYA

Abstract

We consider a general plurality voting game with multiple candidates, where voter preferences over candidates are exogenously given. In particular, we allow for arbitrary voter indifferences, as may arise in voting subgames of citizen‐candidate or locational models of elections. We prove that the voting game admits pure strategy equilibria in undominated strategies. The proof is constructive: we exhibit an algorithm, the “best winning deviation” algorithm, that produces such an equilibrium in finite time. A byproduct of the algorithm is a simple story for how voters might learn to coordinate on such an equilibrium.

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  • John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2009. "Voting Equilibria in Multi‐candidate Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 875-889, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:6:p:875-889
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01433.x
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    1. John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2009. "Voting Equilibria in Multi‐candidate Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 875-889, December.
    2. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    3. Amrita Dhillon & Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen‐Candidate Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 171-184, April.
    4. Francesco De sinopoli & Alessandro Turrini, 2002. "A Remark on Voters’ Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 163-170, April.
    5. repec:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:2:p:163-70 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    7. Thomas R. Palfrey, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(1), pages 139-156.
    8. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June.
    9. repec:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:2:p:171-84 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. James Bergin & Dan Bernhardt, 2004. "Comparative Learning Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(2), pages 431-465, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2009. "Voting Equilibria in Multi‐candidate Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 875-889, December.

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