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Citizen candidates in the lab: Rules, costs, and positions

Author

Listed:
  • Elbittar, Alexander
  • Gomberg, Andrei
  • Trujano-Ochoa, Dario

Abstract

We report the findings from a study that explores candidate participation in a context where citizens can become candidates under both plurality and run-off voting systems. The study also considers the influence of entry costs and different platforms of potential candidates. While our findings align with the expected outcomes of the citizen-candidate model, there is a notable over-participation by candidates from less favorable electoral positions. These entry patterns adjusted well to the QRE. This research adds to the existing body of knowledge about what motivates candidates to enter races under different voting systems and analyzes the behavior of candidates in extreme positions.

Suggested Citation

  • Elbittar, Alexander & Gomberg, Andrei & Trujano-Ochoa, Dario, 2024. "Citizen candidates in the lab: Rules, costs, and positions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:112:y:2024:i:c:s2214804324001137
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102276
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Citizen candidates; Electoral systems; Laboratory experiment; Quantal response;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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