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Performance Measure Congruity and the Balanced Scorecard

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  • JÖRG BUDDE

Abstract

This paper studies the incentive effects of a balanced scorecard within a multitask agency framework under both formal and relational contracts. First, the main characteristics of the balanced scorecard are analyzed with respect to performance measure congruity. It is shown that under complete verifiability, a properly designed balanced scorecard is capable of perfectly aligning the interests of owners and employees by means of an explicit contract. I then investigate whether subjective performance evaluation is beneficial when not all the scorecard measures are contractible. It emerges that congruity of the contractible scorecard measures constrains a purely implicit incentive contract, but the first‐best solution may still be obtained through a combination of formal and relational contracts. Furthermore, a purely explicit contract in most cases can be improved by incorporating subjective rewards.

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  • Jörg Budde, 2007. "Performance Measure Congruity and the Balanced Scorecard," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 515-539, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:45:y:2007:i:3:p:515-539
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2007.00246.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrizia Pastore & Antonio Ricciardi & Silvia Tommaso, 2020. "Contractual networks: an organizational model to reduce the competitive disadvantage of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Europe’s less developed regions. A survey in southern Italy," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 1503-1535, December.
    2. Pérez Granero, Luis & Guillén, Manuel & Bañón-Gomis, Alexis J., 2017. "Influencia de los factores de contingencia en el desarrollo del cuadro de mando integral y su asociación con un rendimiento mejor. El caso de las empresas españolas," Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 82-94.
    3. Jitender Kumar & Neha Prince & H. Kent Baker, 2022. "Balanced Scorecard: A Systematic Literature Review and Future Research Issues," FIIB Business Review, , vol. 11(2), pages 147-161, June.
    4. Dietrichson, Jens, 2013. "Coordination Incentives, Performance Measurement and Resource Allocation in Public Sector Organizations," Working Papers 2013:26, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    5. Margaret A. Abernethy & Jan Bouwens & Laurence Van Lent, 2013. "The Role of Performance Measures in the Intertemporal Decisions of Business Unit Managers," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(3), pages 925-961, September.
    6. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2023. "Relational incentive contracts for teams of multitasking agents," Discussion Papers 2023/10, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, revised 30 Jun 2023.
    7. Narisa Tianjing Dai & Xi (Jason) Kuang & Guliang Tang, 2018. "Differential Weighting of Objective Versus Subjective Measures in Performance Evaluation: Experimental Evidence," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(1), pages 129-148, January.
    8. Burney, Laurie L. & Henle, Christine A. & Widener, Sally K., 2009. "A path model examining the relations among strategic performance measurement system characteristics, organizational justice, and extra- and in-role performance," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 34(3-4), pages 305-321, April.
    9. Delfgaauw, Josse & Souverijn, Michiel, 2016. "Biased supervision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 107-125.
    10. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2023. "Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 619-652, May.
    11. Victor S. Maas & Marcel Van Rinsum, 2013. "How Control System Design Influences Performance Misreporting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 1159-1186, December.
    12. Tim Hensel & Jens Robert Schöndube, 2022. "Big bath accounting and CEO turnover: the interplay between optimal contracts and career concerns," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 92(8), pages 1249-1281, October.
    13. Kroos, P., 2009. "The incentive effects of performance measures and target setting," Other publications TiSEM 944001f9-198b-4b81-8824-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Robert M. Gillenkirch & Heike Kreienbaum, 2017. "What guides subjective performance evaluation: Incentive alignment or norm enforcement?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 933-957, October.
    15. Jongwoon (Willie) Choi & Gary W. Hecht & William B. Tayler, 2013. "Strategy Selection, Surrogation, and Strategic Performance Measurement Systems," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 105-133, March.
    16. Ikram, Atif & Li, Zhichuan (Frank) & Minor, Dylan, 2023. "CSR-contingent executive compensation contracts," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).

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