IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jindec/v54y2006i2p151-199.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Relationships, Competition And The Structure Of Investment Banking Markets

Author

Listed:
  • BHARAT N. ANAND
  • ALEXANDER GALETOVIC

Abstract

It is well known that competition can destroy incentives to invest in firm‐specific relationships. This paper examines how the tension between relationships and competition is resolved in the investment banking market, which for decades has been characterized by both relationships and competition. The model studies the impact on relationships of four different dimensions of competition: non‐exclusive relationships, competition from arm's‐length intermediaries, non‐price competition, and endogenous entry. The analysis shows how market equilibrium adjusts so that relationships are sustained in the face of such competition. Banks are shown to establish relationships without either local or aggregate monopoly power. The model rationalizes two distinct empirical regularities of market structure: the invariance of market concentration to market size; and a pyramidal market structure with an oligopoly comprising similar‐sized players at the top and a large number of small banks at the bottom. The analysis may also shed light on the industrial organization of other professional service industries.

Suggested Citation

  • Bharat N. Anand & Alexander Galetovic, 2006. "Relationships, Competition And The Structure Of Investment Banking Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 151-199, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:151-199
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00279.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00279.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00279.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Masahiko Aoki & Serdar Dinc, 1997. "Relational Financing as an Institution and its Viability under Competition," Working Papers 97011, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    2. von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2004. "Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 11-23, March.
    3. Mr. Bharat Narendra Anand & Mr. Alexander Galetovic P., 2001. "Investment Banking and Security Market Development: Does Finance Follow Industry?," IMF Working Papers 2001/090, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Matthews, John O., 1994. "Struggle and Survival on Wall Street: The Economics of Competition Among Securities Firms," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195050639.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Marta Degl'Innocenti & Franco Fiordelisi & Claudia Girardone & Nemanja Radić, 2019. "Competition and risk‐taking in investment banking," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(2), pages 241-260, May.
    2. Choi, Jay Pil & Stefanadis, Christodoulos, 2015. "Monitoring, cross subsidies, and universal banking," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 48-55.
    3. Presbitero, Andrea F. & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2011. "Competition and relationship lending: Friends or foes?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 387-413, July.
    4. Sumit Agarwal & Robert Hauswald, 2008. "The choice between arm's-length and relationship debt: evidence from e-loans," Working Paper Series WP-08-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    5. Degryse, Hans & Ongena, Steven, 2007. "The impact of competition on bank orientation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-424, July.
    6. Ogura, Yoshiaki, 2010. "Interbank competition and information production: Evidence from the interest rate difference," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 279-304, April.
    7. Juan Eberhard & Jaime F. Lavín & Alejandro Montecinos-Pearce & José Arenas, 2019. "Analyzing Stock Brokers’ Trading Patterns: A Network Decomposition and Spatial Econometrics Approach," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-18, July.
    8. Djedidi-Kooli, Salima, 2009. "L’accès au financement des PME en France : quel rôle joué par la structure du système bancaire ?," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/8354 edited by Etner, François.
    9. John Asker, 2006. "Sharing Investment Bankers," Working Papers 06-23, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    10. Azarmsa, Ehsan & Cong, Lin William, 2020. "Persuasion in relationship finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 818-837.
    11. Alfred Yawson & Huizhong Zhang, 2021. "Central Hub M&A Advisors [Common advisers in mergers and acquisitions: determinants and consequences]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 25(6), pages 1817-1857.
    12. Carbo-Valverde, Santiago & Rodriguez-Fernandez, Francisco & Saunders, Anthony, 2021. "Underwriting bank bonds: Information sharing, certification and distribution networks," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    13. Tlili, Rim, 2012. "Comment justifier la multibancarité au sein des PME ?," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/10919 edited by Etner, François.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bharat N. Anand & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Does Competition Kill Relationships? Inside Investment Banking," Documentos de Trabajo 119, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    2. Bharat N. Anand & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Investment Banking and Security Market Development: Does Finance Follow Industry?," Documentos de Trabajo 121, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    3. Bharant N. Anand & Alexander Galetovic, 2000. "Relationships, Competition, and the Structure of Investment Banking Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 96, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    4. Heinrich, Ralph P., 1999. "Complementarities in Corporate Governance - A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan," Kiel Working Papers 947, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Kirschenmann, K., 2010. "The Dynamics in Requested and Granted Loan Terms when Bank and Borrower Interact Repeatedly," Other publications TiSEM 40d5005c-1626-4511-aa8a-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Wenlian Gao & Feifei Zhu & Kai Chen, 2023. "The role of bank lenders in firm leverage adjustments," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 63-97, February.
    7. Kobayashi, Teruyoshi & Takaguchi, Taro, 2018. "Identifying relationship lending in the interbank market: A network approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 20-36.
    8. Martin Brown & Steven Ongena & Pinar Yeşin, 2014. "Information Asymmetry and Foreign Currency Borrowing by Small Firms," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 56(1), pages 110-131, March.
    9. Christa N. Gibbs & Benedict Guttman-Kenney & Donghoon Lee & Scott Nelson & Wilbert Van der Klaauw & Jialan Wang, 2024. "Consumer Credit Reporting Data," Staff Reports 1114, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    10. Matteo Migheli, 2017. "The winner’s curse in auctions with losses," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 16(1), pages 113-126, November.
    11. Melanie Cao & Shouyong Shi, 2001. "Screening, Bidding, and the Loan Market Tightness," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 5(1-2), pages 21-61.
    12. Wei Yin & Kent Matthews, 2018. "Why Do Firms Switch Banks? Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(9), pages 2040-2052, July.
    13. Armonat, Stefan & Pfnür, Andreas, 2002. "Basel II and the German credit crunch?," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 35585, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    14. Cieply Sylvie, 2001. "The Radical Change of French Firms’ Financial Characteristics. Macroeconomic Consequences and Lessons for Political Economics / Die französische Finanzrevolution. Die Folgen für die Finanzstruktur der," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 221(5-6), pages 556-576, October.
    15. Mjøs, Aksel & Myklebust, Tor Åge & Persson, Svein-Arne, 2011. "On the Pricing of Performance Sensitive Debt," Discussion Papers 2011/5, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, revised 07 May 2012.
    16. Régis Breton, 2003. "A Smoke Screen Theory of Financial Intermediation," Post-Print halshs-00257188, HAL.
    17. Carletti, Elena & Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 2007. "Multiple-bank lending: Diversification and free-riding in monitoring," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 425-451, July.
    18. Marcin Grzelak, 2019. "The Hold-up Problem and Banking Relationships: Evidence from the Polish SME Sector," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2019(6), pages 670-687.
    19. Ongena, Steven & Paraschiv, Florentina & Reite, Endre J., 2023. "Counteroffers and Price Discrimination in Mortgage Lending," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    20. Albertazzi, Ugo & Cimadomo, Jacopo & Maffei-Faccioli, Nicolò, 2021. "Foreign banks and the doom loop," Working Paper Series 2540, European Central Bank.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:151-199. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.