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An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with "Third Party" Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance

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  • Thakor, Anjan V

Abstract

In markets in which sellers know more about product quality than buyers, but cannot convey their superior information either by directly issuing costly signals of the Spence type or by successfully funding the production of information, I suggest another way in which the informational asymmetry problem can be resolved; a third party can produce the necessary information at a cost and use it to price a service consumed by the sellers. Buyers can then observe a seller's choice of service consumption level and be well informed in equilibrium. In this framework I construct a model in which a borrower's choice of insurance coverage signals its default probability to lenders, and explore the properties of the resulting signalling equilibrium in a variety of cases.
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  • Thakor, Anjan V, 1982. "An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with "Third Party" Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(3), pages 717-739, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:37:y:1982:i:3:p:717-39
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    1. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gautam Goswami & Martin Grace & Michael Rebello, 2008. "Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(1), pages 67-95, March.
    2. Lee, Wayne L & Thakor, Anjan V & Vora, Gautam, 1983. "Screening, Market Signalling, and Capital Structure Theory," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(5), pages 1507-1518, December.
    3. Sung, Jaeyoung, 1997. "Corporate Insurance and Managerial Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 297-332, June.
    4. Agrawal, Ashwini & Kim, Daniel, 2021. "Municipal bond insurance and the U.S. drinking water crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118888, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Stuart I. Greenbaum & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Bank Funding Modes," Finance 0411052, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Kirstein Annette & Kirstein Roland & Gerhard Hans, 2010. "Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 107-124, May.
    7. Park, Min, 2018. "What drives corporate insurance demand? Evidence from directors' and officers' liability insurance in Korea," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 235-257.
    8. Dario Cestau & Burton Hollifield & Dan Li & Norman Schürhoff, 2019. "Municipal Bond Markets," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 65-84, December.
    9. Brown, Craig O., 2017. "The politics of government financial management: Evidence from state bonds," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 158-175.
    10. Gore, Angela K & Sachs, Kevin & Trzcinka, Charles, 2004. "Financial Disclosure and Bond Insurance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(1), pages 275-306, April.
    11. Martin Eling & Ruo Jia & Jieyu Lin & Casey Rothschild, 2022. "Technology heterogeneity and market structure," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(2), pages 427-448, June.
    12. Roger D. Stover & Mark F. Schmitz, 1997. "Private Information in Bank Certification:Evidence from U.S. and Non-U.S. Bank Standby Letters of Credit," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 1(4), pages 309-324, December.
    13. Natee Amornsiripanitch, 2022. "Bond Insurance and Public Sector Employment," Working Papers 22-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    14. Lang (Kate) Yang & Ruth Winecoff, 2022. "Municipal bond sectoral risk and information intermediation in uncertain times: Evidence from the Covid‐19 pandemic," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 34-53, December.
    15. Timothy Riddiough, 2001. "Intermediation, Standardization and Learning in Financial Markets: Some Evidence and Implications," Wisconsin-Madison CULER working papers 01-09, University of Wisconsin Center for Urban Land Economic Research.
    16. Xueying Zhang & Shansheng Gao & Jian Jiao, 2018. "Moral Hazard Effects of Corporate Bond Guarantee Purchases: Empirical Evidence from China," Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, AMH International, vol. 10(5), pages 100-115.
    17. Amornsiripanitch, Natee, 2022. "The real effects of municipal bond insurance market disruptions11This paper was previous circulated with the title “Bond Insurance and Public Sector Employment.” I thank Gary Gorton, Andrew Metrick, H," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).

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