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The 2011 America Invents Act: Does it Undermine Innovation?

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  • Kaz Miyagiwa

Abstract

With the 2011 America Invents Act, the United States discarded its century‐old first‐to‐invent patent‐awarding system in favor of a first‐to‐file rule. Critics have argued that the first‐to‐file rule rewards speed in patent applications rather than creativity, thereby undermining innovation. We evaluate this concern within a dynamic model of a patent race, and find first‐to‐invent (weakly) more conducive to innovation than first‐to‐file. Defending prior users’ rights can promote both pro‐ and anti‐R&D effect of a switch to first‐to‐file.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaz Miyagiwa, 2015. "The 2011 America Invents Act: Does it Undermine Innovation?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 211-227, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:24:y:2015:i:2:p:211-227
    DOI: 10.1111/jems.12092
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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Panagopoulos & Kyriakos Drivas, 2016. "Using the Patent Term Changes in Assessing the Evolution of Patent Valuation from Filing to Maturity," Working Papers 1608, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    2. Miyagiwa, Kaz & Ohno, Yuka, 2015. "International harmonization of the patent-issuing rules," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 81-89.
    3. Chung-Cheng Yang & Jianxiong Chen & Wen-Chi Yang, 2021. "The Impact of the Amendment of Taiwan’s Certified Public Accountant Act in 2007 on Large Accounting Firms," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-22, January.
    4. Tetsugen Haruyama & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2018. "The Patent-issuing Rules and Economic Growth: Are We in a "Wrong" Patent Regime?," Working Papers 1805, Florida International University, Department of Economics.

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