International harmonization of the patent-issuing rules
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.02.004
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- Kaz Miyagiwa & Yuka Ohno, 2012. "International Harmonization of the Patent-Issuing Rules," ISER Discussion Paper 0837, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Kaz Miyagiwa, 2015. "The 2011 America Invents Act: Does it Undermine Innovation?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 211-227, June.
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Cited by:
- Tetsugen Haruyama & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2018. "The Patent-issuing Rules and Economic Growth: Are We in a "Wrong" Patent Regime?," Working Papers 1805, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
R&D competition; Patent laws and legislation; Intellectual property rights; Patent priority rules; Sequential innovation; Management of technological innovation and R&D;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
- O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
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