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Board Efficiency and Internal Corporate Control Mechanisms

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  • Clara Graziano
  • Annalisa Luporini

Abstract

We analyze the interactions between internal and external control mechanisms in a framework in which the board selects the CEO and then decides whether to retain or dismiss him after observing a signal regarding his ability. The novel aspect of our paper is that we consider both the hiring and the firing of the CEO by the board. The type of board is defined by its ability to select a good CEO, so that the quality of the CEO depends on the type of board. Then, the dismissal‐retention decision provides information not only on the quality of the CEO but also on the board's type. We show that the board's behavior depends on the pressure from the takeover market and on whether its type is publicly known. When the pressure from the takeover market is high and the type of board is private information, the board prefers not to dismiss the manager even if it has received a very low signal regarding his quality. Hence, our model endogenously derives a collusion between board and CEO in which the board does not fire a bad CEO. This behavior emerges as an attempt to hide the board's inability to accomplish the first task, CEO selection, by distorting the second task, the CEO retention‐dismissal decision.

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  • Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2003. "Board Efficiency and Internal Corporate Control Mechanisms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 495-530, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:12:y:2003:i:4:p:495-530
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00495.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stéphane Hallegatte, 2005. "Accounting for Extreme Events in the Economic Assessment of Climate Change," Working Papers 2005.1, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2012. "Ownership concentration, monitoring, and optimal board structure," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3333-3346.
    3. Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2010. "Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks," CESifo Working Paper Series 3028, CESifo.
    4. Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam & Weisbach, Michael S., 2013. "What do boards really do? Evidence from minutes of board meetings☆☆Miriam Schwartz-Ziv is from Harvard University and Northeastern University, e-mail: miriam.schwartz@mail.huji.ac.il. Michael S. Weisb," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 349-366.
    5. Stoilkovska, Aleksandra & Gramatnikovski, Sashko & Serafimovic, Gordana, 2019. "The Influence Of The Use Of Power In Corporate Governance On The Socially Responsible Policies Of A Competing Company," UTMS Journal of Economics, University of Tourism and Management, Skopje, Macedonia, vol. 10(1), pages 77-84.
    6. Wołoszyn, Maciej & Kułakowski, Krzysztof, 2023. "Status achieved in an organization—Rank dynamics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 610(C).
    7. Miriam Schwartz-Ziv & Michael Weisbach, 2011. "What do Boards Really Do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings," NBER Working Papers 17509, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2006. "Disciplining and Screening Top Executives," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-054/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. Dirk Sliwka, 2007. "Managerial Turnover and Strategic Change," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(11), pages 1675-1687, November.
    10. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, December.

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