Accounting for Extreme Events in the Economic Assessment of Climate Change
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Cited by:
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 57-77, July.
- Stéphane Hallegatte & Michael Ghil & Patrice Dumas & Jean Charles Hourcade, 2008. "Business Cycles, Bifurcations and Chaos in a Neo-Classical Model with Investment Dynamics," Post-Print halshs-00007196, HAL.
- Rosso, Gianluca & Ricca, Andrea & Chieppa, Alessandro, 2014. "Climate Events and Insurance Demand - The effect of potentially catastrophic events on insurance demand in Italy," MPRA Paper 62903, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Climate change; Extreme events; Economic impacts;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General
- E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
- O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
- O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2005-03-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2005-03-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2005-03-13 (Network Economics)
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