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Incomplete Information Games With Multiple Priors

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  • ATSUSHI KAJII
  • TAKASHI UI

Abstract

We present a model of incomplete information games, where each player is endowed with a set of priors. Upon arrival of private information, it is assumed that each player “updates” his set of priors to a set of posterior beliefs, and then evaluates his actions by the most pessimistic posterior beliefs. So each player's preferences may exhibit aversion to ambiguity or uncertainty. We define a couple of equilibrium concepts, establish existence results for them, and demonstrate by examples how players’ views on uncertainty about the environment affect the strategic outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Atsushi Kajii & Takashi Ui, 2005. "Incomplete Information Games With Multiple Priors," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(3), pages 332-351, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:56:y:2005:i:3:p:332-351
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00327.x
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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