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Agreement and stochastic independence of belief functions

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  • Lo, Kin Chung

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  • Lo, Kin Chung, 2006. "Agreement and stochastic independence of belief functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-22, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:51:y:2006:i:1:p:1-22
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    1. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1992. "Additive Representation of Non-Additive Measures and the Choquet Integral," Discussion Papers 985, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Lo, Kin Chung, 2002. "Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 183-209, November.
    3. Ghirardato, Paolo & Le Breton, Michel, 2000. "Choquet Rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 277-285, February.
    4. Machina, Mark J & Schmeidler, David, 1992. "A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 745-780, July.
    5. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
    6. Lo, Kin Chung, 1996. "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November.
    7. Ghirardato, Paolo, 1997. "On Independence for Non-Additive Measures, with a Fubini Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 261-291, April.
    8. Hendon, Ebbe & Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen & Sloth, Birgitte & Tranaes, Torben, 1996. "The product of capacities and belief functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 95-108, October.
    9. Kajii, Atsushi & Kojima, Hiroyuki & Ui, Takashi, 2007. "Cominimum additive operators," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 218-230, February.
    10. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    11. Daniel Ellsberg, 2000. "Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7605, David K. Levine.
    12. Ebbe Groes & Hans Jørgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 37-66, January.
    13. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    14. Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
    15. Lo, Kin Chung, 2000. "Epistemic conditions for agreement and stochastic independence of [epsi]-contaminated beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 207-234, March.
    16. Daniel Ellsberg, 1961. "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 75(4), pages 643-669.
    17. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
    18. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 1999. "E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 107-138, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lo, Kin Chung, 2009. "Correlated Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 722-743, March.
    2. Saralees Nadarajah, 2011. "Exact distribution of the product and the quotient of belief functions," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 735-738, April.
    3. Lo, Kin Chung, 2007. "Sharing beliefs about actions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 123-133, March.

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