IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jecrev/v46y1995i1p2-22.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Product Liability Rules: A Consideration Of Law And Economics In Japan

Author

Listed:
  • Koichi Hamada

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Koichi Hamada, 1995. "Product Liability Rules: A Consideration Of Law And Economics In Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 46(1), pages 2-22, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:46:y:1995:i:1:p:2-22
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00002.x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1983. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 581-589, Autumn.
    2. Ota, Shozo, 1991. "Law and economics in Japan: Hatching stage," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 301-308, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Takaoka, Sumiko, 2005. "The effects of product liability costs on R&D with asymmetric information," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 59-81, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2017. "Optimal Liability when Consumers Mispredict Product Usage," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 19(1), pages 202-243.
    2. Miceli Thomas J. & Segerson Kathleen, 2013. "Liability versus Regulation for Dangerous Products When Consumers Vary in Their Susceptibility to Harm and May Misperceive Risk," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 341-355, December.
    3. Lusk Jayson L. & Marette Stéphan, 2012. "Can Labeling and Information Policies Harm Consumers?," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, October.
    4. Tomas J. Philipson & Eric Sun, 2008. "Is the Food And Drug Administration Safe And Effective?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 85-102, Winter.
    5. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2024. "Law and Economics of Artificial Intelligence: Optimal Liability Rules for Accident Losses Caused by Fully Autonomous Vehicles," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 40, pages 49-75.
    6. Stéphan Marette & John Beghin, 2017. "Are Standards Always Protectionist?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: John Christopher Beghin (ed.), Nontariff Measures and International Trade, chapter 11, pages 179-192, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Anne-Célia Disdier & Stéphan Marette, 2012. "Taxes, minimum-quality standards and/or product labeling to improve environmental quality and welfare: Experiments can provide answers," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 337-357, June.
    8. Eric Giraud-Héraud & Cristina Grazia & Abdelhakim Hammoudi, 2012. "Explaining the Emergence of Private Standards in Food Supply Chains," Working Papers hal-00749345, HAL.
    9. Tim Friehe, 2014. "Tacit collusion and liability rules," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 453-469, December.
    10. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2016. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 274-304, June.
    11. Thomas J. Miceli & Rebecca Rabon & Kathleen Segerson, 2012. "Liability versus Regulation for Controlling Product-Related Risks," Working papers 2012-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    12. Yongmin Chen & Xinyu Hua, 2017. "Competition, Product Safety, and Product Liability," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 237-267.
    13. Yongmin Chen & Xinyu Hua, 2012. "Ex Ante Investment, Ex Post Remedies, And Product Liability," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(3), pages 845-866, August.
    14. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2014. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5003, CESifo.
    15. Sunding, David L. & Zilberman, David, 1998. "Allocating Product Liability in a Multimarket Setting," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-11, March.
    16. Alfred Endres & Tim Friehe, 2013. "The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law: incentives for abatement and R&D," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 753-770, March.
    17. Thomas J. Miceli & Rebecca Rabon & Kathleen Segerson, 2012. "Liability versus Regulation for Dangerous Products When Consumers Vary in Their Susceptibility to Harm and Misperceive Risk," Working papers 2012-15, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    18. Ram Singh, 2009. "RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 89-112, February.
    19. Stéphan Marette & Jutta Roosen & Sandrine Blanchemanche, 2008. "Taxes and subsidies to change eating habits when information is not enough: an application to fish consumption," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 119-143, October.
    20. Charreire, Maxime & Langlais, Eric, 2021. "Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:46:y:1995:i:1:p:2-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/jeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.