Liability versus Regulation for Dangerous Products When Consumers Vary in Their Susceptibility to Harm and Misperceive Risk
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
products liability; regulation; risk perceptions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HEA-2012-09-22 (Health Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2012-09-22 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-MKT-2012-09-22 (Marketing)
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