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Quid Pro Quo. The Effect of Issue Linkage on Member States' Bargaining Success in European Union Lawmaking

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  • Adam Kirpsza

Abstract

This paper investigates how issue linkage between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council affects Member States' bargaining success in European Union lawmaking. Drawing from the spatial model of EU decision‐making and the relais actors thesis, it theorizes the general and conditional effect of inter‐institutional package deals on states' bargaining satisfaction. Using the DEUII dataset, the analysis reveals the following findings. First, issue linkage has a varying effect on preference attainment as cross‐legislation packages decrease states' bargaining success, while within‐legislation logrolls increase it. Second, states with centrist preferences are less successful when issue linkage occurs. By contrast, package deals favour Member States sharing positions with the EP and those holding the EP rapporteur and the Council presidency. However, these effects vary with the type of package deals and the voting rule in the Council. Third, in contrast to conventional negotiations, issue linkage produces a relatively symmetric distribution of bargaining success among Member States.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Kirpsza, 2023. "Quid Pro Quo. The Effect of Issue Linkage on Member States' Bargaining Success in European Union Lawmaking," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 323-343, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:61:y:2023:i:2:p:323-343
    DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13369
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    References listed on IDEAS

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