IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jbfnac/v26y1999i7-8p883-917.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Voluntary Disclosure of Profit Forecasts by Target Companies in Takeover Bids

Author

Listed:
  • Niamh Brennan

Abstract

This paper examines factors influencing voluntary forecast disclosure by target companies, whether good/bad news forecasts are disclosed and the influence of forecasts on the outcome of hostile bids. Disclosure was significantly more likely during contested bids. In agreed bids, probability of forecast disclosure was greater the shorter the bid horizon. In contested bids, forecasts were more likely where there were large block shareholdings, for larger targets and for targets in the capital goods industry. There was a clear tendency to disclose good news forecasts. A significant positive association between forecast disclosure and increase in offer price was found.

Suggested Citation

  • Niamh Brennan, 1999. "Voluntary Disclosure of Profit Forecasts by Target Companies in Takeover Bids," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(7‐8), pages 883-917, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:26:y:1999:i:7-8:p:883-917
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5957.00279
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00279
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1468-5957.00279?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Skinner, Dj, 1994. "Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad-News," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 38-60.
    2. Cotter, James F. & Zenner, Marc, 1994. "How managerial wealth affects the tender offer process," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 63-97, February.
    3. Agrawal, Anup & Mandelker, Gershon N., 1990. "Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 143-161, June.
    4. Stulz, Rene M & Walkling, Ralph A & Song, Moon H, 1990. "The Distribution of Target Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 817-833, July.
    5. Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, 1990. "Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 3(2), pages 60-69, June.
    6. Peter M. Clarkson & Jennifer L. Kao & Gordon D. Richardson, 1994. "The Voluntary Inclusion of Forecasts in the MD&A Section of Annual Reports," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 423-450, June.
    7. Ronan G. Powell, 1997. "Modelling Takeover Likelihood," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(7‐8), pages 1009-1030, September.
    8. Shivdasani, Anil, 1993. "Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 167-198, April.
    9. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    10. Ajinkya, Bb & Gift, Mj, 1984. "Corporate Managers Earnings Forecasts And Symmetrical Adjustments Of Market Expectations," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 425-444.
    11. DeAngelo, Linda Elizabeth, 1988. "Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance : The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 3-36, January.
    12. Jarrell, Gregg A. & Poulsen, Annette B., 1987. "Shark repellents and stock prices : The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 127-168, September.
    13. Roger S. Casey & Peter H. Eddey, 1986. "Defence Strategies of Listed Companies Under the Takeover Code," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 11(2), pages 153-172, December.
    14. Thompson, Rb & Olsen, C & Dietrich, Jr, 1987. "Attributes Of News About Firms - An Analysis Of Firm-Specific News Reported In The Wall Street Journal Index," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 245-274.
    15. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    16. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    17. Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1988. "Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 101-136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January.
    19. Hoskin, Re & Hughes, Js & Ricks, We, 1986. "Evidence On The Incremental Information-Content Of Additional Firm Disclosures Made Concurrently With Earnings," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24, pages 1-32.
    20. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 1989. "Managers' voting rights and corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 263-290, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lu, Cuicui & Parsley, David & Xue, Bing, 2024. "Economic policy uncertainty and voluntary disclosures:How do Chinese firms respond?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 141-167.
    2. Thomas Schleicher & Martin Walker, 2010. "Bias in the tone of forward‐looking narratives," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(4), pages 371-390.
    3. Martin Guggenberger & Anna Rohlfing-Bastian, 2016. "Delegation of strategic decision-making authority to middle managers," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 155-179, May.
    4. Zha Giedt, Jenny, 2016. "Economic Consequences of Announcing Strategic Alternatives," MPRA Paper 81356, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Sep 2017.
    5. Isabelle Martinez & Emmanuelle Negre, 2011. "Les déterminants de la communication volontaire des entreprises cibles d'OPA/OPE : le cas des synergies," Post-Print hal-00650551, HAL.
    6. Peter M. Clarkson & Allen Craswell & Prue Mackenzie, 2008. "The Effect of Board Independence on Target Shareholder Wealth," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 18(2), pages 135-148, June.
    7. Brennan, Niamh M. & Daly, Caroline A. & Harrington, Claire S., 2010. "Rhetoric, argument and impression management in hostile takeover defence documents," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 253-268.
    8. Richard Chung & Bryan Byung-Hee Lee & Woo-Jong Lee & Byungcherl Charlie Sohn, 2016. "Do Managers Withhold Good News from Labor Unions?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(1), pages 46-68, January.
    9. Belanès, Amel & Saihi, Malek, 2016. "Evidence on complementarity and substitution contingency in monitoring and bonding mechanisms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 161-171.
    10. Niamh Brennan & S. J. Gray, 2000. "Rhetoric and argument in financial reporting : disclosures in profit forecasts and takeover documents," Open Access publications 10197/2965, Research Repository, University College Dublin.
    11. Niamh Brennan, 2000. "An empirical examination of forecast disclosure by bidding companies," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 175-194.
    12. Bazrafshan, Ebrahim & Kandelousi, Amene S. & Hooy, Chee-Wooi, 2016. "The impact of earnings management on the extent of disclosure and true financial performance: Evidence from listed firms in Hong Kong," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 206-219.
    13. Norhani Aripin & Greg Tower & Grantley Taylor, 2011. "Insights on the diversity of financial ratios communication," Asian Review of Accounting, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 19(1), pages 68-85, May.
    14. Meng, Yifan & Yang, Mo & Li, Weiping, 2024. "Skilled analysts and earnings management in Chinese listed companies," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(PB), pages 227-243.
    15. Charoenwong, Charlie & Ding, David K. & Siraprapasiri, Vasan, 2011. "Adverse selection and corporate governance," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 406-420, June.
    16. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G., 2001. "Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 405-440, September.
    17. Vasiliki Athanasakou & Khaled Hussainey, 2014. "The perceived credibility of forward-looking performance disclosures," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(3), pages 227-259, June.
    18. Anders Ekholm & Daniel Pasternack, 2005. "The negative news threshold—An explanation for negative skewness in stock returns," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(6), pages 511-529.
    19. Ruth V. Aguilera & Igor Filatotchev & Howard Gospel & Gregory Jackson, 2008. "An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 475-492, June.
    20. Yuan Ding & Hervé Stolowy, 2003. "Les facteurs déterminants de la stratégie des groupes français en matière de communication sur les activités de R&D," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 6(1), pages 39-62, March.
    21. Glode, Vincent & Opp, Christian C. & Zhang, Xingtan, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 652-688.
    22. Bugeja, Martin, 2007. "Voluntary use of independent valuation advice by target firm boards in takeovers," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 368-387, September.
    23. Emmanuelle Negre & Isabelle Martinez, 2012. "Une Analyse Lexicale Des Communiques De Presse Volontaires Emis Lors Des Opa/Ope : Quels Profils De Diffusion ?," Post-Print hal-00936567, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Noel O'Sullivan & Pauline Wong, 1999. "Board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers: some UK evidence," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 139-155.
    2. Sokolyk, Tatyana, 2011. "The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 612-627, June.
    3. Strickland, Deon & Wiles, Kenneth W. & Zenner, Marc, 1996. "A requiem for the USA Is small shareholder monitoring effective?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 319-338, February.
    4. Noel O'Sullivan & Pauline Wong, 1998. "Internal versus External Control: An Analysis of Board Composition and Ownership in UK Takeovers," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 2(1), pages 17-35, March.
    5. Bradbury, Michael E. & Mak, Y. T., 2000. "Ownership structure, board composition and the adoption of charter takeover procedures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 165-188, July.
    6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    7. Robin Nuttall, 1999. "Takeover Likelihood Models for UK Quoted Companies," Economics Series Working Papers 1999-W06, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    8. Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2015. "CEO Preferences and Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2813-2852, December.
    9. Peter M Clarkson & Shams Pathan & Andrew Tellam, 2016. "Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 41(2), pages 244-270, May.
    10. Goldman, Eitan & Qian, Jun, 2005. "Optimal toeholds in takeover contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 321-346, August.
    11. St-Pierre, Josee & Gagnon, Jean-Marie & Saint-Pierre, Jacques, 1996. "Concentration of voting rights and board resistance to takeover bids," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 45-73, December.
    12. Cotter, James F. & Shivdasani, Anil & Zenner, Marc, 1997. "Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 195-218, February.
    13. Charlie Weir, 1997. "Corporate governance, performance and take-overs: an empirical analysis of UK mergers," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(11), pages 1465-1475.
    14. Bauguess, Scott W. & Moeller, Sara B. & Schlingemann, Frederik P. & Zutter, Chad J., 2009. "Ownership structure and target returns," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 48-65, February.
    15. Hong Li & Yuan Wang, 2016. "How do Corporate Governance Decisions Affect Bondholders?," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 6(03), pages 1-23, September.
    16. Martynova, M., 2006. "The market for corporate control and corporate governance regulation in Europe," Other publications TiSEM 8651e281-4914-41f2-ac14-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    17. Gillan, Stuart L. & Starks, Laura T., 2000. "Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 275-305, August.
    18. Peter M. Clarkson & Allen Craswell & Prue Mackenzie, 2008. "The Effect of Board Independence on Target Shareholder Wealth," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 18(2), pages 135-148, June.
    19. Carline, Nicholas F. & Linn, Scott C. & Yadav, Pradeep K., 2014. "Corporate governance and the nature of takeover resistance," CFR Working Papers 14-01, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    20. Sang Cheol Lee & Mooweon Rhee & Jongchul Yoon, 2018. "Foreign Monitoring and Audit Quality: Evidence from Korea," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-22, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:26:y:1999:i:7-8:p:883-917. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0306-686X .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.