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Bailouts, Monitoring, and Penalties: An Integrated Framework of Government Policies to Manage the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem

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  • Ning Gong
  • Kenneth D. Jones

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  • Ning Gong & Kenneth D. Jones, 2013. "Bailouts, Monitoring, and Penalties: An Integrated Framework of Government Policies to Manage the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 13(3), pages 299-325, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:irvfin:v:13:y:2013:i:3:p:299-325
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/irfi.12011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jose Fique, 2016. "A Microfounded Design of Interconnectedness-Based Macroprudential Policy," Staff Working Papers 16-6, Bank of Canada.
    2. Gómez, Fabiana, 2015. "Failed bank takeovers and financial stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 45-58.
    3. Moch Nils, 2018. "The Contribution of Large Banking Institutions to Systemic Risk: What Do We Know? A Literature Review," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 69(3), pages 231-257, December.
    4. VERMEULEN, Glen & KORT, Peter, 2014. "Real options and bank bailouts: How uncertainty affects optimal bank bailout policy," Working Papers 2014021, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    5. Yu, Lin & Bai, Tao & Yin, Jingwei & Tan, Xue, 2024. "Overcoming the liability of origin by hiring foreign independent directors: Evidence from Chinese firms' cross-border M&As," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(2).
    6. Ly, Kim Cuong & Liu, Hong & Opong, Kwaku, 2017. "Who acquires whom among stand-alone commercial banks and bank holding company affiliates?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 144-158.
    7. Iwanicz-Drozdowska, Małgorzata & Smaga, Paweł & Witkowski, Bartosz, 2016. "Bank restructuring in the EU: Which way to go?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 572-586.
    8. De Caux, Robert & McGroarty, Frank & Brede, Markus, 2017. "The evolution of risk and bailout strategy in banking systems," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 468(C), pages 109-118.

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