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Non-compliance with India's Factories Act: Magnitude and patterns

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  • Urmila CHATTERJEE
  • Ravi KANBUR

Abstract

While non-compliance with legislation and regulations is said to be rife in developing countries, there is limited systematic evidence of the magnitude of non-compliance. The authors quantify non-compliance with India's Factories Act in 2010 and find that the number of non-compliant firms is nearly twice that of compliant firms, and much larger than the number of firms “adjusting out” of the legislation. Thus, non-compliance with the Factories Act is a key feature of India's “missing middle”. The main trends and patterns of non-compliance are explored, and a number of key issues highlighted for further analytical and policy research.

Suggested Citation

  • Urmila CHATTERJEE & Ravi KANBUR, 2015. "Non-compliance with India's Factories Act: Magnitude and patterns," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 154(3), pages 393-412, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:intlab:v:154:y:2015:i:3:p:393-412
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Irfan Ahmad SOFI & Mohd Hussain KUNROO, 2018. "Demand shocks and employment adjustments: Does employment protection legislation create rigidity?," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 157(3), pages 461-480, September.

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