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Why is Agricultural Trade Policy Always So Difficult to Reform? Warum gestaltet sich die Reform der Agrarhandelspolitik jedes Mal so schwierig? Pourquoi la politique commerciale agricole est‐elle toujours si difficile à réformer ?

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  • Jonathan Brooks

Abstract

Why Is Agricultural Trade Policy Always So Difficult To Reform? Multilateral trade negotiations have once again foundered, at least in part, over agriculture. In previous rounds, discussions stalled because of the reluctance of some OECD countries to reform their agricultural policies and dismantle protection; this time an impasse was reached over the extent to which developing countries should be expected to do the same. Historically OECD countries have tended to protect their agricultural sectors, whereas developing countries have tended to tax them. The main reasons for this are political. Consumers in high‐income countries spend a smaller share of their budgets on food and are less concerned about the implications of elevated prices. At the same time, farmers account for a much lower share of the workforce, which means that a given transfer to producers imposes a smaller burden on the overall economy. As developing countries have become richer and as labour has started to leave the farm sector, the political calculus has changed, and they too are starting to protect their farmers. Yet there is a lack of consensus on when poorer countries may have a legitimate need to protect their farmers. Clarifying the economic circumstances under which tariff protection may be appropriate is a pre‐requisite for progress in multilateral trade negotiations. Les négociations commerciales multilatérales se sont de nouveau effondrées, au moins partiellement à cause de l’agriculture. Lors des cycles précédents, les discussions avaient calé parce que certains pays de l’OCDE renâclaient à réformer leurs politiques agricoles et à démanteler leur protection; cette fois, on a atteint une impasse concernant la mesure dans laquelle les pays en développement seraient supposés faire de même. Au plan historique, les pays de l’OCDE ont eu tendance à protéger leurs secteurs agricoles alors que les pays en développement tendaient à les taxer. Les principales raisons de ces différences sont politiques. Les consommateurs des pays à haut revenu consacrent une part inférieure de leur budget à l’alimentation et sont moins inquiets des conséquences d’une élévation des prix. En même temps, les agriculteurs représentent une part bien plus faible de la main d’œuvre; ainsi, un niveau de transfert aux producteurs donné pèse moins lourdement sur l’économie dans son ensemble. A mesure que les pays en développement s’enrichissent et que la main d’œuvre commence à quitter le secteur agricole, le calcul politique change et ces pays commencent eux aussi à protéger leurs agriculteurs. A ce jour, il n’y a pas de consensus sur les circonstances dans lesquelles les pays plus pauvres pourraient légitimement avoir besoin de protéger leurs agriculteurs. Il est indispensable à l’avancement des négociations commerciales multilatérales de clarifier les circonstances économiques dans lesquelles une protection tarifaire serait adéquate. Die multilateralen Handelsverhandlungen sind wieder einmal – zumindest in Teilen – an der Landwirtschaft gescheitert. In den vorherigen Runden gerieten die Gespräche ins Stocken, da einige OECD‐Länder Vorbehalte gegen die Reform ihrer jeweiligen Agrarpolitik und den Protektionsabbau hatten. Dieses Mal entstand die Pattsituation in der Diskussion über die Frage, in welchem Maß dies auch von den Entwicklungsländern erwartet werden kann. In der Vergangenheit neigten OECD‐Länder eher dazu, ihre Agrarsektoren zu protektionieren, während Entwicklungsländer dazu neigten, ihre Agrarsektoren zu besteuern. Dies hat hauptsächlich politische Gründe: Verbraucher in einkommensstarken Ländern geben einen geringeren Teil ihres Einkommens für Lebensmittel aus und machen sich weniger Gedanken über Preiserhöhungen. Gleichzeitig sind immer weniger Menschen in der Landwirtschaft beschäftigt, so dass sich die Transferzahlungen an die Erzeuger in geringerem Maße auf die Gesamtwirtschaft auswirken. Da die Entwicklungsländer inzwischen wohlhabender geworden sind und ihre Arbeitskräfte zunehmend den Agrarsektor verlassen, hat sich das politische Kalkül geändert – sie beginnen nun auch, ihre Landwirte zu protektionieren. Es gibt jedoch noch keinen Konsens darüber, unter welchen Bedingungen ärmere Länder legitimiert sind, ihre Landwirte zu protektionieren. Die wirtschaftlichen Umstände, unter denen tarifärer Außenschutz angemessen ist, müssen unbedingt geklärt werden, damit die multilateralen Handelsverhandlungen voranschreiten können.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Brooks, 2009. "Why is Agricultural Trade Policy Always So Difficult to Reform? Warum gestaltet sich die Reform der Agrarhandelspolitik jedes Mal so schwierig? Pourquoi la politique commerciale agricole est‐elle touj," EuroChoices, The Agricultural Economics Society, vol. 8(2), pages 38-43, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:eurcho:v:8:y:2009:i:2:p:38-43
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-692X.2009.00131.x
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    1. Swinnen, Jo & van der Zee, Frans A, 1993. "The Political Economy of Agricultural Policies: A Survey," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 20(3), pages 261-290.
    2. Dalila Cervantes-Godoy & Jonathan Brooks, 2008. "Smallholder Adjustment in Middle-Income Countries: Issues and Policy Responses," OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers 12, OECD Publishing.
    3. Jonathan Brooks, 1996. "Agricultural Policies In Oecd Countries: What Can We Learn From Political Economy Models?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1‐4), pages 366-389, January.
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