IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ehsrev/v71y2018i2p418-436.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Quakers, coercion, and pre†modern growth: why Friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement did not matter for early modern trade expansion

Author

Listed:
  • Esther Sahle

Abstract

During the late seventeenth century, Atlantic trade grew dramatically. The New Institutional Economists attribute this to institutional developments. During this period, Quakers emerged as the region's most prominent trading community. Some historians explain this achievement as the result of the competitive advantage that Quakers gained from their formal institutions for contract enforcement. This article studies the London Quaker community to show that, in fact, they only began to police the conduct of business regularly after 1750, as part of a wider effort to promote the Society's reputation. Formal institutional advantages cannot explain the Quakers’ early trading success.

Suggested Citation

  • Esther Sahle, 2018. "Quakers, coercion, and pre†modern growth: why Friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement did not matter for early modern trade expansion," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 71(2), pages 418-436, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:71:y:2018:i:2:p:418-436
    DOI: 10.1111/ehr.12485
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12485
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ehr.12485?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nathan Nunn, 2009. "The Importance of History for Economic Development," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 65-92, May.
    2. McCloskey, Deirdre Nansen, 2006. "The Bourgeois Virtues," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226556635, December.
    3. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    4. Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-950, October.
    5. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson, 2005. "The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 546-579, June.
    6. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1190-1213, September.
    7. Zahedieh,Nuala, 2010. "The Capital and the Colonies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521514231, January.
    8. Ann Prior & Maurice Kirby, "undated". "The Society of Friends and the Family Firm, 1700-1830," Working Papers ec11/93, Department of Economics, University of Lancaster.
    9. Gareth Austin, 2008. "The 'reversal of fortune' thesis and the compression of history: Perspectives from African and comparative economic history," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(8), pages 996-1027.
    10. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671347, January.
    11. Chang, Ha-Joon, 2011. "Reply to the comments on ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(4), pages 595-613, December.
    12. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1231-1294.
    13. Chang, Ha-Joon, 2011. "Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(4), pages 473-498, December.
    14. Gauci, Perry, 2001. "The Politics of Trade: The Overseas Merchant in State and Society, 1660-1720," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199241934.
    15. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
    16. Robin Pearson & David Richardson, 2008. "Social capital, institutional innovation and Atlantic trade before 1800," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(6), pages 765-780.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nicholas Burton & Matthew Sinnicks, 2022. "Quaker Business Ethics as MacIntyrean Tradition," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 507-518, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sahle, Esther, 2014. "Quakers, coercion and pre-modern growth: why friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement did not matter for early Atlantic trade expansion," Economic History Working Papers 60452, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    2. James Fenske, 2013. "Does Land Abundance Explain African Institutions?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(12), pages 1363-1390, December.
    3. Nunn, Nathan, 2014. "Historical Development," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 7, pages 347-402, Elsevier.
    4. Broadberry, Stephen & Ghosal, Sayantan & Proto, Eugenio, 2017. "Anonymity, efficiency wages and technological progress," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 379-394.
    5. Baland, Jean-Marie & Moene, Karl Ove & Robinson, James A., 2010. "Governance and Development," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4597-4656, Elsevier.
    6. ROUGIER Eric, 2015. ""The parts and the whole”: Unbundling and re-bundling institutional systems and their effect on economic development," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2015-12, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    7. Martina Cioni & Giovanni Federico & Michelangelo Vasta, 2022. "Persistence studies: a new kind of economic history?," Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer;Gesellschaft für Regionalforschung (GfR), vol. 42(3), pages 227-248, December.
    8. Sascha O. Becker & Katrin Boeckh & Christa Hainz & Ludger Woessmann, 2016. "The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long‐Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(590), pages 40-74, February.
    9. Vania Licio, 2021. "When History Leaves a Mark: A New Measure of Roman Roads," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 7(1), pages 1-35, March.
    10. Beck, T.H.L., 2010. "Legal Institutions and Economic Development," Other publications TiSEM 8aa07b48-ce55-4cf6-8754-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Marina Tkalec, 2020. "History matters: development and institutional persistence of the Habsburg Military Frontier in Croatia," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 44(1), pages 117-145.
    12. Andres Irarrazaval, 2023. "The Pillars of Shared Prosperity: Insights From Elite versus State Extraction And From a New Instrument," Working Papers wp549, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    13. Long, Cheryl & Murrell, Peter & Yang, Li, 2019. "Memories of colonial law: The inheritance of human capital and the location of joint ventures in early-reform China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    14. Heineck, Guido & Süssmuth, Bernd, 2013. "A different look at Lenin’s legacy: Social capital and risk taking in the Two Germanies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 789-803.
    15. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    16. Guinnane, Timothy W., 2023. "We Do Not Know the Population of Every Country in the World for the Past Two Thousand Years," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 912-938, September.
    17. Broadberry Stephen, 2012. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Very Long Run Growth: A Historical Appraisal," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook, De Gruyter, vol. 53(1), pages 277-306, May.
    18. Bhattacharyya, Sambit, 2009. "Institutions, diseases, and economic progress: a unified framework," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 65-87, April.
    19. Focacci, Chiara Natalie & Kovac, Mitja & Spruk, Rok, 2023. "Ethnolinguistic diversity, quality of local public institutions, and firm-level innovation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    20. Hao Wang & Yuemei Ji & Qi Luo, 2020. "The Employment Effect of Inward FDI in China: What Do We Learn from the History?," CESifo Working Paper Series 8392, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:71:y:2018:i:2:p:418-436. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ehsukea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.