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Voting On Income‐Contingent Loans For Higher Education

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  • ELENA DEL REY
  • MARÍA RACIONERO

Abstract

We consider risk-averse individuals who differ in two characteristics - ability to benefit from education and inherited wealth - and analyze higher education participation under two alternative financing schemes - tax subsidy and (risk-sharing) income-contingent loans. With decreasing absolute risk aversion, wealthier individuals are more likely to undertake higher education despite the fact that, according to the stylized financing schemes we consider, individuals do not pay any up-front financial cost of education. We then determine which financing scheme arises when individuals are allowed to vote between schemes. We show that the degree of risk aversion plays a crucial role in determining which financing scheme obtains a majority, and that the composition of the support group for each financing scheme can be of two different types.
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Suggested Citation

  • Elena Del Rey & María Racionero, 2012. "Voting On Income‐Contingent Loans For Higher Education," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(s1), pages 38-50, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:88:y:2012:i:s1:p:38-50
    DOI: j.1475-4932.2012.00801.x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1475-4932.2012.00801.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Del Rey, Elena & Racionero, María, 2010. "Financing schemes for higher education," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 104-113, March.
    2. Chapman, Bruce, 2006. "Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: International Reforms," Handbook of the Economics of Education, in: Erik Hanushek & F. Welch (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Education, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 25, pages 1435-1503, Elsevier.
    3. Rainald Borck & Martin Wimbersky, 2014. "Political economics of higher education finance," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 115-139, January.
    4. Garcia-Penalosa, Cecilia & Walde, Klaus, 2000. "Efficiency and Equity Effects of Subsidies to Higher Education," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 702-722, October.
    5. Dan Anderberg & Alessandro Balestrino, 2008. "The Political Economy of Post-Compulsory Education Policy with Endogenous Credit Constraints," CESifo Working Paper Series 2304, CESifo.
    6. De Fraja, Gianni, 2001. "Education Policies: Equity, Efficiency and Voting Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(471), pages 104-119, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Are income-contingent loans for higher education feasible?
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-09-01 19:21:00

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe De Donder & Francisco Martinez-Mora, 2015. "On the Political Economy of University Admission Standards," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/11, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    2. Maria Racionero & Elena Del Rey, 2012. "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-pooling," CEPR Discussion Papers 671, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    3. Maria Racionero & Elena Del Rey, 2012. "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-pooling," CEPR Discussion Papers 671, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    4. De Donder, Philippe & Martinez-Mora, Francisco, 2017. "The political economy of higher education admission standards and participation gap," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 1-9.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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