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Bribes in a Supply Line

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  • Amal Sanyal

Abstract

The paper models the practice of charging bribes for faster delivery of essential services. It then examines the possibility of curbing corruption by supervision and by introducing competition among delivery agents. It is argued that a supervisory solution eludes the problem because no hard evidence of the reduction of corruption can be established for this type of offence. It is then shown that using more than one supplier reduces the bribe rate and the waiting period for both bribe-payers and others; and the aggregate gain of consumers exceeds the cost of hiring additional suppliers. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2004.

Suggested Citation

  • Amal Sanyal, 2004. "Bribes in a Supply Line," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 71, pages 155-168, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:71:y:2004:i::p:155-168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1986. "On the Nature of Competition with Differentiated Products," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(381), pages 160-172, March.
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    4. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    5. Sanyal, Amal, 2000. "Audit Hierarchy in a Corrupt Tax Administration," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 364-378, June.
    6. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2000. "Harassment, corruption and tax policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 75-94, March.
    7. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    8. Saha, Bibhas, 2001. "Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 113-133, June.
    9. Alexeev, Michael, 1989. "A note on privileges in a queue-rationed CPE with black markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 422-430, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anna Kochanova, 2012. "The Impact of Bribery on Firm Performance: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp473, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    2. Hanousek, Jan & Kochanova, Anna, 2015. "Bribery Environment and Firm Performance: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 10499, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats : Une revue de la littérature microéconomique," Working Papers 2005-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

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