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Corruption, Default and Optimal Credit in Welfare Programs

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  • Bibhas Saha

Abstract

In this paper a dynamic model of subsidized credit provision is presented to examine how asymmetric information exacerbates inefficiency caused by corruption. Though designed to empower the underprivileged, the fate of such credit programs largely depends on the efficiency of the credit delivery system. [IGIDR WP 2004-001].

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  • Bibhas Saha, 2008. "Corruption, Default and Optimal Credit in Welfare Programs," Working Papers id:1600, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1600
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    1. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Gupta, Manash Ranjan, 1996. "Delayed formal credit, bribing and the informal credit market in agriculture: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 433-449, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Saha, Bibhas & Thampy, Trivikraman, 2006. "Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 182-204, June.

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