IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecinqu/v56y2018i2p1417-1436.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Law Enforcement And Wrongful Arrests With Endogenously (In)Competent Officers

Author

Listed:
  • Ajit Mishra
  • Andrew Samuel

Abstract

Economic intuition suggests that enforcement errors incentivize crimes, therefore officers must be penalized for committing such errors. Legal scholars argue that if penalties for errors are severe, officers may become timid while policing (thereby encouraging crime). We evaluate these arguments in a model where officers invest in competence. Competence increases the officer's ability to identify criminals. Low sanctions for errors encourages bold policing by officers but may still raise the equilibrium level of crime because it also discourages investments in competence. Granting immunity to only competent officers (“qualified immunity”) reduces both errors and crimes when competence is observable. (JEL K4, K42, L5)

Suggested Citation

  • Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2018. "Law Enforcement And Wrongful Arrests With Endogenously (In)Competent Officers," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1417-1436, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:56:y:2018:i:2:p:1417-1436
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12534
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12534
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ecin.12534?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. DeAngelo, Gregory & Owens, Emily G., 2017. "Learning the ropes: General experience, task-Specific experience, and the output of police officers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 368-377.
    2. Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2005. "Torts, Expertise, and Authority: Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 494-519, Autumn.
    3. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-159, January.
    4. Png, I. P. L., 1986. "Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 101-105, June.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Gerrit De Geest, 2012. "Who Should Be Immune from Tort Liability?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 291-319.
    7. Sue H. Mialon, 2008. "The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 22-44, May.
    8. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
    9. Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, 2016. "Reducing False Guilty Pleas and Wrongful Convictions through Exoneree Compensation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 173-189.
    10. Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, 2006. "Generalising the Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, With an Application to Vehicle Searches in Wichita," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(515), pages 351-367, November.
    11. Henrik Lando, 2006. "Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 327-337, June.
    12. BRYAN C. McCANNON, 2009. "Differentiating Between First And Repeat Offenses," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(1), pages 76-85, January.
    13. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1989. "Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 99-108, Spring.
    14. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    15. Nuno Garoupa & Matteo Rizzolli, 2012. "Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(2), pages 224-231, June.
    16. Fabio Méndez, 2014. "Can corruption foster regulatory compliance?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 189-207, January.
    17. Tsebelis, George, 1989. "The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 77-91, March.
    18. Spengler Dominic, 2014. "Endogenous Detection of Collaborative Crime: The Case of Corruption," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 201-217, July.
    19. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    20. Clare Leaver, 2009. "Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 572-607, June.
    21. DeAngelo Gregory & McCannon Bryan C., 2016. "Public Outcry and Police Behavior," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 619-645, April.
    22. Jeremy A. Sandford, 2010. "Experts and quacks," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 199-214, March.
    23. Mungan, Murat C., 2015. "Wrongful convictions and the punishment of attempts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 79-87.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Samuel & Ajit Mishra, 2022. "Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(3), pages 328-344, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2012. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 311-338.
    2. Thomas J. Miceli & Murat C. Mungan, 2021. "The limit of law: factors influencing the decision to make harmful acts illegal," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 293-307, September.
    3. Roee Sarel, 2022. "Crime and punishment in times of pandemics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 155-186, October.
    4. Andrew Samuel & Ajit Mishra, 2022. "Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(3), pages 328-344, July.
    5. Lando, Henrik & Mungan, Murat C., 2018. "The effect of type-1 error on deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 1-8.
    6. Mungan Murat C., 2013. "Optimal Warning Strategies: Punishment Ought Not to Be Inflicted Where the Penal Provision Is Not Properly Conveyed," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 303-339, November.
    7. Šastitko, Andrej E., 2013. "Effects of third party errors," EconStor Preprints 121747, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    8. Zhiyong (John) Liu & Zhewei Wang & Zhendong Yin, 2022. "When is duplication of effort a good thing in law enforcement?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(4), pages 682-708, August.
    9. Dominic Spengler, 2012. "Endogenising Detection in an Asymmetric Penalties Corruption Game," Discussion Papers 12/20, Department of Economics, University of York.
    10. Mungan, Murat C., 2015. "Wrongful convictions and the punishment of attempts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 79-87.
    11. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2014. "In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral Explanations of Pro-defendant Bias in Procedures," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 60(3), pages 554-580.
    12. Kaplow, Louis, 2017. "Optimal design of private litigation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 64-73.
    13. Rimawan Pradiptyo, 2015. "A Certain Uncertainty; Assessment of Court Decisions in Tackling Corruption in Indonesia," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: R N Ghosh & M A B Siddique (ed.), CORRUPTION, GOOD GOVERNANCE and ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Contemporary Analysis and Case Studies, chapter 10, pages 167-215, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    14. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2009. "Public Enforcement of Law," Chapters, in: Nuno Garoupa (ed.), Criminal Law and Economics, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Spengler Dominic, 2014. "Endogenous Detection of Collaborative Crime: The Case of Corruption," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 201-217, July.
    16. Mungan, Murat C., 2014. "A behavioral justification for escalating punishment schemes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 189-197.
    17. Alexander Lundberg, 2024. "Do prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(2), pages 650-674, April.
    18. Pavlova, Natalia & Shastitko, Andrey, 2016. "Leniency programs and socially beneficial cooperation: Effects of type I errors," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 375-401.
    19. Stan Miles & Derek Pyne, 2015. "Deterring repeat offenders with escalating penalty schedules: a Bayesian approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 229-250, August.
    20. Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2017. "On Punishment Severity and Crime Rates," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 464-485.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:56:y:2018:i:2:p:1417-1436. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.