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The Behavior Of Inexperienced Bidders In Internet Auctions

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  • JEFFREY A. LIVINGSTON

Abstract

In Internet auctions, bidders alter their strategies as they gain market experience. While inexperienced bidders bid the same high amounts regardless of the seller’s reputation, experienced bidders bid substantially less if the seller has yet to establish a reputation and raise their bids as reports are filed that the seller has treated bidders well in the past. Experienced bidders also wait until much closer to the end of the auction to place their bids, although it takes very little experience to learn that waiting to submit one’s bid is a superior strategy. (JEL L14, L15, D83, D12)

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey A. Livingston, 2010. "The Behavior Of Inexperienced Bidders In Internet Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 237-253, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:48:y:2010:i:2:p:237-253
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00128.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Kang Ernest & Shiu, Ji-Liang & Sun, Chia-Hung, 2013. "How different are consumers in Internet auction markets? Evidence from Japan and Taiwan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 1-12.
    2. Casalin, Fabrizio & Dia, Enzo, 2019. "Information and reputation mechanisms in auctions of remanufactured goods," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 185-212.
    3. Wen Cao & Qinyang Sha & Zhiyong Yao & Dingwei Gu & Xiang Shao, 2019. "Sniping in soft-close online auctions: empirical evidence from overstock," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 179-191, June.
    4. Genti Kostandini & Elton Mykerezi & Eftila Tanellari & Nour Dib, 2011. "Does Buyer Experience Pay Off? Evidence from eBay," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 39(3), pages 253-265, November.
    5. Chia-Hung D. Sun & Yi-Bin Chiu & Ming-Fei Hsu, 2016. "The Determinants Of Price In Online Auctions: More Evidence From Quantile Regression," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 268-286, April.
    6. Jeffrey A. Livingston & Patrick A. Scholten, 2019. "The Effect of ID Verification in Online Markets: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(3), pages 595-615, May.
    7. Cong Feng & Scott Fay & K. Sivakumar, 2016. "Overbidding in electronic auctions: factors influencing the propensity to overbid and the magnitude of overbidding," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 241-260, March.
    8. Shiu, Ji-Liang & Sun, Chia-Hung D., 2014. "Modeling and estimating returns to seller reputation with unobserved heterogeneity in online auctions," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 59-67.
    9. Bramsen, Jens-Martin, 2008. "Learning to bid, but not to quit – Experience and Internet auctions," MPRA Paper 14815, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis

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