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Yes Minister: Invaluable Material For Teaching The Public Choice Of Bureaucracy

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  • John Considine

Abstract

Conveying the logical consequences of modelling the individual as self‐interested in the public sector bureaucracy is not an easy task. One has to avoid, without dismissing, normative judgments and issues of empirical validity in order to focus on the logical consequence. Illustrating the theory in a memorable way is also difficult. This paper argues that Yes Minister provides ideal material for the task.

Suggested Citation

  • John Considine, 2006. "Yes Minister: Invaluable Material For Teaching The Public Choice Of Bureaucracy," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 55-61, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:55-61
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2006.00650.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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