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Do Markets Penalize Agency Conflicts Between Controlling And Minority Shareholders? Evidence From Chile

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  • Fernando LEFORT
  • Eduardo WALKER

Abstract

Using a sample of Chilean listed firms with widespread presence of economic conglomerates that use pyramid structures to control affiliated companies, we find that firms where controlling shareholders have higher coincidence between cash and control rights are persistently more valued by the market. We carefully check that our results are not driven by omitted variable biases and control for reverse causation using a feature of Chilean Corporations Law that provides an exogenous instrument for ownership concentration.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernando LEFORT & Eduardo WALKER, 2007. "Do Markets Penalize Agency Conflicts Between Controlling And Minority Shareholders? Evidence From Chile," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 45(3), pages 283-314, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:deveco:v:45:y:2007:i:3:p:283-314
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-1049.2007.00044.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Fernando Lefort & Rodrigo Gonzalez, 2008. "Hacia Un Mejor Gobierno Corporativo En Chile," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 11(1), pages 19-45.
    2. Fernando Lefort, 2005. "Ownership Structure And Corporate Governance In Latin America," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 8(1), pages 55-84.
    3. Sakthi Mahenthiran & Tom Gjerde & Berta Silva, 2020. "Stock Market Contagion during the Global Financial Crises: Evidence from the Chilean Stock Market," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-22, April.
    4. Victor Dragotă & Radu Ciobanu, 2017. "The Unusual Case of the Discount Offers for Taking the Control: Evidence from Romania," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2017(1), pages 36-54.
    5. Jara, Mauricio & López-Iturriaga, Félix & San Martín, Pablo & Saona, Paolo & Tenderini, Giannina, 2019. "Chilean pension fund managers and corporate governance: The impact on corporate debt," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 321-337.
    6. Sonia P. Jurfest & Ricardo D. Paredes & Julio Riutort, 2015. "Control Premium and Corporate Regulatory Changes: Theory and Evidence," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 53(3), pages 159-187, September.
    7. Jorge Andrés Munoz Mendoza & Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo & Carmen Lissette Veloso Ramos, 2018. "Effects of Corporate Policies and Governance Practices on Ownership Structure: Evidence from Chilean Firms," Revista Finanzas y Politica Economica, Universidad Católica de Colombia, vol. 10(2), pages 269-286, November.
    8. San Martín, Pablo & Saona, Paolo, 2017. "Capital structure in the Chilean corporate sector: Revisiting the stylized facts," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 163-174.
    9. Fernando Lefort & Rodrigo Gonzalez, 2011. "Holding Company Discounts and Business Groups Optimal Bailout of Subsidiaries," Working Papers 34, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    10. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, December.
    11. Mauricio Jara-Bertin & Jean P. Sepulveda, 2014. "Earnings Management and Performance in Family-Controlled Firms:Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Serie Working Papers 01, Universidad del Desarrollo, School of Business and Economics, revised Nov 2014.
    12. Victor Dragotă & Radu Ciobanu, . "The Unusual Case of the Discount Offers for Taking the Control: Evidence from Romania," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 0, pages 1-19.
    13. Ruqia Shaikh & Zhiqiang Li & Xiaoli Wang & Muhammad Rizwan Nazir, 2022. "Firm innovation and ultimate control mechanism: Case of emerging market," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(2), pages 440-456, March.
    14. Sakthi Mahenthiran & Berta Silva Palavecinos & Hanns De La Fuente-Mella, 2020. "The Effect of Board Links, Audit Partner Tenure, and Related Party Transactions on Misstatements: Evidence from Chile," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-21, December.
    15. Liangliang Jiang & Yi Zhu, 2014. "Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership on Foreign Bank Lending: Some Evidence for Emerging Markets," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 14(2), pages 263-293, June.
    16. Paolo Saona & Laura Muro & Pablo San Martín & Carlos Cid, 2020. "Ibero-American corporate ownership and boards of directors: implementation and impact on firm value in Chile and Spain," Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 2138-2170, January.
    17. Lefort, Fernando & Urzúa, Francisco, 2008. "Board independence, firm performance and ownership concentration: Evidence from Chile," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 61(6), pages 615-622, June.
    18. Urzúa Infante, F., 2014. "Essays on ownership and control," Other publications TiSEM f17a9a42-f7a7-4ffa-a95d-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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