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Can Corporate Governance be Rated? Ideas based on the Greek experience

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  • Lena Tsipouri
  • Manolis Xanthakis

Abstract

The paper presents an attempt to quantify the compliance of Greek companies with international best practices. Based on 37 indicators (composed out of 54 questions) it was found that Greek companies demonstrate a fairly satisfactory degree of compliance with OECD guidelines. Their weak points lie in: the role of stakeholders and corporate social responsibility; the organisation of CG; the effective role of the independent members of the board (which may be attributed to the small size of the pool of potential independent board members); disclosure of remuneration; and risk management. Methodologically, the merit of the exercise lies in its approach towards the creation of “collectively subjective” weightings, an effort to discuss the benefits of separating the rating of the market from the rating of companies and the discussion on typologies of work that can be effectively performed through rating exercises.

Suggested Citation

  • Lena Tsipouri & Manolis Xanthakis, 2004. "Can Corporate Governance be Rated? Ideas based on the Greek experience," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 16-28, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:12:y:2004:i:1:p:16-28
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00340.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brian J. Hall, 1998. "The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 6674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Udayasankar, Krishna & Das, Shobha & Krishnamurti, Chandrasekhar, 2008. "When is Two Really Company? The Effects of Competition and Regulation on Corporate Governance," Working Paper Series 4020, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    2. Vasiliki Bazdekidu, 2015. "Corporate management in Greece in the context of debt crisis," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 91-105.
    3. Windsor, Duane, 2009. "Tightening corporate governance," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 306-316, September.
    4. Spanos, Loukas & Tsipouri, Lena & Xanthakis, Manolis, 2006. "Corporate governance rating in a small open capital market: Methodology and applications in the Greek market," MPRA Paper 42896, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Udayasankar, Krishna & Das, Shobha & Krishnamurti, Chandrasekhar, 2008. "When is Two Really Company? The Effects of Competition and Regulation on Corporate Governance," Working Paper Series 19122, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    6. Burak Pirgaip & Mehmet Berktay Akyüz, 2020. "To Be Rated or To Be Indexed: Corporate Governance Rating Experience in Borsa Istanbul," Istanbul Business Research, Istanbul University Business School, vol. 49(2), pages 271-300, November.
    7. Michail Nerantzidis, 2018. "The role of weighting in corporate governance ratings," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(3), pages 589-628, September.
    8. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19122 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Toudas, Kanellos & Karathanassis, George, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Results from Greek Firms," MPRA Paper 6414, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Apostolos Dasilas, 2009. "The ex-dividend day stock price anomaly: evidence from the Greek stock market," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 23(1), pages 59-91, March.
    11. Chalevas, Constantinos G., 2011. "The Effect of the Mandatory Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Executive Compensation," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 138-174, June.
    12. Rose, Caspar, 2016. "Firm performance and comply or explain disclosure in corporate governance," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 202-222.
    13. Mohammad Nurunnabi & Monirul Alam Hossain & Saad A. Al-Mosa, 2016. "Ceci n'est pas une pipe! Corporate Governance practices under two political regimes in Bangladesh: A political economy perspective," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 13(4), pages 329-363, November.
    14. Spanos, Loukas, 2005. "Corporate governance in Greece: developments and policy implications," MPRA Paper 42901, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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