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Canadian Tax Reform As Public Choice

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  • ZANE SPINDLER
  • MICHAEL WALKER

Abstract

One may view current Canadian tax reform as an episode in a tax reform cycle arising from a continual public choice game. Both the positions of the Canadian players and the rules of the game may provide a rationale for these reforms. Revenue, equity, efficiency, and bargaining constraints determine the evolution of the tax code.

Suggested Citation

  • Zane Spindler & Michael Walker, 1988. "Canadian Tax Reform As Public Choice," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 6(4), pages 70-84, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:6:y:1988:i:4:p:70-84
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00548.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
    2. Thomas S. McCaleb, 1985. "Public Choice Perspectives on the Flat Tax Follies," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(2), pages 613-628, Fall.
    3. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "Tax Reform as Political Choice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 29-35, Summer.
    4. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Xavier de Vanssay & Zane A. Spindler, 1994. "Is Tax Reform in the Public Interest? a Rent-Seeking Perspective," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(1), pages 3-21, January.
    2. Berggren, Niclas, 2003. "The Frailty of Economic Reforms: Political Logic and Constitutional Lessons," Ratio Working Papers 1, The Ratio Institute.

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