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Canadian Farm Income Safety Nets And U.S. Countervail Law

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  • DARREN EURICH
  • JOHN SPRIGGS
  • JULIA TAYLOR

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the factors explaining U.S. countervail action. Factors that indicate changes in the political economic environment are incorporated into a logit model to explain the propensity to initiate a countervail suit. These factors, augmented by variables representing foreign subsidy specificity, are used in a logit model to explain the propensity to levy a countervail duty, once a suit is initiated. Evidence indicates that factors that would lead to political lobbying are significant in the initiation of a countervail suit. However, these variables are not significant in explaining the propensity to actually levy a duty; rather, the analysis finds that subsidy specificity criteria are the significant variables.

Suggested Citation

  • Darren Eurich & John Spriggs & Julia Taylor, 1998. "Canadian Farm Income Safety Nets And U.S. Countervail Law," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 16(1), pages 47-57, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:16:y:1998:i:1:p:47-57
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1998.tb00499.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stallings, David A., 1990. "Increased Protection in the 1980's: Exchange Rates and Institutions," 1990: The Environment, Government Policies, and International Trade Meeting, December 1990, San Diego, CA 50885, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    2. Takacs, Wendy E, 1981. "Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(4), pages 687-693, October.
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