IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/chinae/v32y2024i4p114-145.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Can a Teacher Salary Increase Promote Students' Educational Performance?

Author

Listed:
  • Tianyang Liu
  • Baozhong Su
  • Jingjing Wang
  • Scott Rozelle

Abstract

Policymakers in China have attempted to improve the quality of rural education by investing in teacher salaries through initiatives like the Rural Teachers Support Plan (RTSP). This study estimates the effects of teacher salary increase on students' educational outcomes in rural China by utilizing the exogenous variations of rural teacher salaries induced by the RTSP. It employs an intensity‐based difference‐in‐differences strategy and panel data from 2010 to 2018 with 3,351 rural children. The findings reveal that an increase in teacher salaries had a significant positive impact on students' examination results. Moreover, the results of mechanism analysis indicate that salary increases could have both quality and quantity effects on students' outcomes by increasing the proportion of highly educated teachers and reducing the student–teacher ratio. Our findings contribute to the discussion on the importance of teacher salary incentives in education production functions and provide insights for other countries undertaking rural education reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Tianyang Liu & Baozhong Su & Jingjing Wang & Scott Rozelle, 2024. "Can a Teacher Salary Increase Promote Students' Educational Performance?," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 32(4), pages 114-145, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:chinae:v:32:y:2024:i:4:p:114-145
    DOI: 10.1111/cwe.12543
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12543
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/cwe.12543?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kingdon, Geeta Gandhi & Teal, Francis, 2007. "Does performance related pay for teachers improve student performance? Some evidence from India," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 473-486, August.
    2. Altonji, Joseph G & Paxson, Christina H, 1988. "Labor Supply Preferences, Hours Constraints, and Hours-Wage Trade-Offs," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(2), pages 254-276, April.
    3. Prashant Loyalka & Sean Sylvia & Chengfang Liu & James Chu & Yaojiang Shi, 2019. "Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(3), pages 621-662.
    4. Jonah E. Rockoff, 2004. "The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence from Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 247-252, May.
    5. Decio Coviello & Erika Deserranno & Nicola Persico, 2022. "Minimum Wage and Individual Worker Productivity: Evidence from a Large US Retailer," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(9), pages 2315-2360.
    6. Joppe de Ree & Karthik Muralidharan & Menno Pradhan & Halsey Rogers, 2018. "Double for Nothing? Experimental Evidence on an Unconditional Teacher Salary Increase in Indonesia," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 993-1039.
    7. Karthik Muralidharan & Venkatesh Sundararaman, 2011. "Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(1), pages 39-77.
    8. Eric A. Hanushek & Marc Piopiunik & Simon Wiederhold, 2019. "The Value of Smarter Teachers: International Evidence on Teacher Cognitive Skills and Student Performance," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 54(4), pages 857-899.
    9. Figlio, David N. & Kenny, Lawrence W., 2007. "Individual teacher incentives and student performance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 901-914, June.
    10. Ying Bai & Ruixue Jia, 2016. "Elite Recruitment and Political Stability: The Impact of the Abolition of China's Civil Service Exam," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 677-733, March.
    11. Akerlof, George A, 1984. "Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 79-83, May.
    12. Hyejin Ku, 2022. "Does Minimum Wage Increase Labor Productivity? Evidence from Piece Rate Workers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 325-359.
    13. Victor Lavy, 2002. "Evaluating the Effect of Teachers' Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1286-1317, December.
    14. Hongyan Liu & Chengfang Liu & Fang Chang & Prashant Loyalka, 2016. "Implementation of Teacher Training in China and Its Policy Implications," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 24(3), pages 86-104, May.
    15. Qi, Di & Wu, Yichao, 2020. "Family’s social economic status and child educational outcomes in China: The mediating effects of parenting practices and children’s learning attitudes," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    16. Hanushek, Eric A, 1986. "The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 24(3), pages 1141-1177, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Berlinski, Samuel & Ramos, Alejandra, 2020. "Teacher mobility and merit pay: Evidence from a voluntary public award program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    2. Johnston, Andrew C., 2021. "Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay," IZA Discussion Papers 14831, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Bourdon, Jean & Frölich, Markus & Michaelowa, Katharina, 2007. "Teacher Shortages, Teacher Contracts and their Impact on Education in Africa," IZA Discussion Papers 2844, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Balch, Ryan & Springer, Matthew G., 2015. "Performance pay, test scores, and student learning objectives," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 114-125.
    5. Felipe Barrera-Osorio & Darío Maldonado & Catherine Rodríguez, 2012. "Calidad de la Educación Básica y Media en Colombia: Diagnóstico y Propuestas," Documentos CEDE 10321, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    6. Woessmann, Ludger, 2011. "Cross-country evidence on teacher performance pay," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 404-418, June.
    7. Emiliana Vegas & Ilana Umansky, 2005. "Improving Teaching and Learning through Effective Incentives : What Can We Learn from Education Reforms in Latin America?," World Bank Publications - Reports 8694, The World Bank Group.
    8. Muralidharan, Karthik & Sundararaman, Venkatesh, 2011. "Teacher opinions on performance pay: Evidence from India," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 394-403, June.
    9. repec:ags:aaea22:335793 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Finn Christensen & James Manley & Louise Laurence, 2010. "The Allocation of Merit Pay in Academia," Working Papers 2010-13, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2010.
    11. Sally Hudson, "undated". "The Effects of Performance-Based Teacher Pay on Student Achievement," Discussion Papers 09-023, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    12. De Fraja, Gianni & Landeras, Pedro, 2006. "Could do better: The effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 189-213, January.
    13. Roland G. Fryer, 2013. "Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 373-407.
    14. Wagner, Valentin & Riener, Gerhard, 2015. "Peers or parents? On non-monetary incentives in schools," DICE Discussion Papers 203, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    15. Derek Neal, 2011. "The Design of Performance Pay in Education," NBER Working Papers 16710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1jgbspo1909q48svne93o55rca is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Jones, Michael D., 2013. "Teacher behavior under performance pay incentives," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 148-164.
    18. Isaac Mbiti & Mauricio Romero & Youdi Schipper, 2023. "Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(653), pages 1968-2000.
    19. Andrea Lepine, 2016. "Teacher Incentives and Student Performance: Evidence from Brazil," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2016_18, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    20. Karthik Muralidharan & Venkatesh Sundararaman, 2011. "Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(1), pages 39-77.
    21. Azam, Mehtabul & Kingdon, Geeta Gandhi, 2015. "Assessing teacher quality in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 74-83.
    22. Hanushek, Eric A., 2011. "The economic value of higher teacher quality," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 466-479, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:chinae:v:32:y:2024:i:4:p:114-145. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iwepacn.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.