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Monitoring Costs and Tolerance Levels for Classroom Cheating

Author

Listed:
  • Gary Galles
  • Philip E. Graves
  • Robert L. Sexton
  • Surrey M. Walton

Abstract

ABSTRACT. The amount of cheating and plagiarism on college campuses has become an increasingly important topic. The usual policy prescription to this type of problem is to step up monitoring efforts. However, this is difficult and costly. An alternative strategy is to substitute tougher and consistent sanctions for cheating and plagiarism.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Galles & Philip E. Graves & Robert L. Sexton & Surrey M. Walton, 2003. "Monitoring Costs and Tolerance Levels for Classroom Cheating," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 713-719, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:62:y:2003:i:4:p:713-719
    DOI: 10.1111/1536-7150.00242
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Graves, Philip E & Lee, Dwight R & Sexton, Robert L, 1989. "Statutes versus Enforcement: The Case of the Optimal Speed Limit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 932-936, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas S. Dee & Brian A. Jacob, 2012. "Rational Ignorance in Education: A Field Experiment in Student Plagiarism," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 47(2), pages 397-434.
    2. Alan Collins & Guy Judge & Neil Rickman, 2007. "On the economics of plagiarism," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 93-107, October.

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