Monitoring Costs and Tolerance Levels for Classroom Cheating
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DOI: 10.1111/1536-7150.00242
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Thomas S. Dee & Brian A. Jacob, 2012.
"Rational Ignorance in Education: A Field Experiment in Student Plagiarism,"
Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 47(2), pages 397-434.
- Thomas S. Dee & Brian A. Jacob, 2010. "Rational Ignorance in Education: A Field Experiment in Student Plagiarism," NBER Working Papers 15672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alan Collins & Guy Judge & Neil Rickman, 2007. "On the economics of plagiarism," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 93-107, October.
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