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The Changing Role of the State in the Electricity Industry in Brazil, China, and India

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  • Carlos Rufín
  • U. Srinivasa Rangan
  • Rajesh Kumar

Abstract

ABSTRACT. Technological breakthroughs, macroeconomic pressures, and advances in economic thought have led to a redefinition of the role of the state from producer to arbiter among private interests. Still, the details of such a redefinition vary among countries. We aim to understand the reasons for such differences and draw their policy implications through a case study of the electricity industry in Brazil, China, and India. Over the past decade, these countries have sought to restructure their state‐owned electric utilities. The restructuring effort has led to different outcomes in the three countries. We argue that ideology, institutional arrangements, and the behavior of interest groups lie at the heart of such differences.

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  • Carlos Rufín & U. Srinivasa Rangan & Rajesh Kumar, 2003. "The Changing Role of the State in the Electricity Industry in Brazil, China, and India," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 649-675, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:62:y:2003:i:4:p:649-675
    DOI: 10.1111/1536-7150.00239
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    1. Parshall, Lily & Pillai, Dana & Mohan, Shashank & Sanoh, Aly & Modi, Vijay, 2009. "National electricity planning in settings with low pre-existing grid coverage: Development of a spatial model and case study of Kenya," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2395-2410, June.
    2. Gokan, Toshitaka & Kichko, Sergey & Thisse, Jacques-François, 2019. "How do trade and communication costs shape the spatial organization of firms?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    3. Wang, Chen & Zhou, Kaile & Yang, Shanlin, 2017. "A review of residential tiered electricity pricing in China," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 533-543.
    4. Ma, Chunbo & He, Lining, 2008. "From state monopoly to renewable portfolio: Restructuring China's electric utility," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1697-1711, May.
    5. García, Clara, 2011. "Grid-connected renewable energy in China: Policies and institutions under gradualism, developmentalism, and socialism," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(12), pages 8046-8050.
    6. Kumar, Rajesh & Rangan, U. Srinivasa & Rufín, Carlos, 2005. "Negotiating complexity and legitimacy in independent power project development," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 302-320, August.
    7. Zvoleff, Alex & Kocaman, Ayse Selin & Huh, Woonghee Tim & Modi, Vijay, 2009. "The impact of geography on energy infrastructure costs," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 4066-4078, October.

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