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Incremental vs. Comprehensive Reform of Economic Regulation: Predictable Outcomes and Unintended Consequences

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  • L. R. Jones
  • Frederick Thompson

Abstract

. Examination of the theory and politics of reform of government regulatory policy leads to the conclusion that comprehensive reform of economic regulation is desirable and possible, given that we understand how existing regulatory decision‐making processes operate and how reform efforts in the past have failed. Options exist along a dimension of magnitude of change: incremental versus comprehensive reform. Under certain conditions regulatory reform is best achieved through comprehensive change and equilibration to new policy, rather than marginal adjustments to existing policy that often lead to more rather than less government regulation. Comprehensive reform is held to be complete or nearly complete relaxation of government control over price, market entry and other aspects of competition among firms across an entire industry, or assumption by government of new, broad‐scale controls over private lector market behavior. Comprehensive reduction of government control, i.e., deregulation, is in accord with the observation that government decision‐makers sometimes behave as if economic efficiency were an important objective.

Suggested Citation

  • L. R. Jones & Frederick Thompson, 1984. "Incremental vs. Comprehensive Reform of Economic Regulation: Predictable Outcomes and Unintended Consequences," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 1-17, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:43:y:1984:i:1:p:1-17
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1984.tb02218.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mitnick, Barry M., 1981. "The strategic uses of regulation -- And deregulation," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 71-83.
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