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Corporate vote trading in Australia

Author

Listed:
  • Tongxia Li
  • Tze Chuan ‘Chewie’ Ang

Abstract

This study finds that institutional investors in Australia recall loaned shares prior to shareholder meetings to exercise their voting rights as part of their effort to improve corporate governance. Recalls are increasingly common in larger firms, firms with more independent directors, and stocks with higher past returns in recent years. Recalls are associated with less support for resolutions at meetings, especially those related to the remuneration package in firms within the ASX100 and those with existing shareholder dissent. We deduce the value of votes (around 351 basis points (bps) per annum) from the incremental cost of borrowing shares with voting rights around shareholder meetings.

Suggested Citation

  • Tongxia Li & Tze Chuan ‘Chewie’ Ang, 2022. "Corporate vote trading in Australia," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(S1), pages 1065-1105, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:62:y:2022:i:s1:p:1065-1105
    DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12818
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Tongxia & Lu, Chun & Chen, Zhihua, 2023. "The unintended consequence of collateral-based financing: Evidence from corporate cost behavior," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1).

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