IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/beo/journl/v57y2012i195p103-114.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Barriers To Competitive Fringe Expansion As A Seed Of Market Power

Author

Listed:
  • Anzhelika Gerasymenko

Abstract

Starting from the behavioural approach to economic competition, this paper enlarges the traditional view of economics on the essence of potential competition by including not only the potency of competition from new but also the potency of competition from existing firms of the competitive fringe and from distant substitutes because of their ability to be actualised upon changes in market conjuncture. The author specifies three types of barriers to potential competition: barriers to entry, barriers to switching demand, and barriers to competitive fringe expansion. This paper is devoted to the analysis of the latter, answering the question of their influence on the market power of incumbent firms. The theoretical and empirical analysis in the paper explains the important role of establishment and exploitation of barriers to competitive fringe expansion in maintaining the market power of a dominant firm and the maximization of its economic rent.

Suggested Citation

  • Anzhelika Gerasymenko, 2012. "Barriers To Competitive Fringe Expansion As A Seed Of Market Power," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 57(195), pages 103-114, October -.
  • Handle: RePEc:beo:journl:v:57:y:2012:i:195:p:103-114
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ekof.bg.ac.rs/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/195-4.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    2. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boone, J., 2004. "Balance of Power," Other publications TiSEM d3f8cd4b-eaf0-4c1c-aed4-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Aslan, Hadiye & Kumar, Praveen, 2016. "The product market effects of hedge fund activism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 226-248.
    3. Dasgupta Utteeyo, 2011. "Are Entry Threats Always Credible?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-41, December.
    4. Boone, Jan, 2004. "Balance of Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 4733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Steven J. Davis & Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, 2004. "Entry, Pricing, and Product Design in an Initially Monopolized Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages 188-225, February.
    6. Joachim Henkel & Eric von Hippel, 2005. "Welfare Implications of User Innovation," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 30(2_2), pages 73-87, January.
    7. E Philip Davis & Dilruba Karim & Dennison Noel, 2019. "Bank Leverage Ratios, Risk and Competition - An Investigation Using Individual Bank Data," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 499, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    8. Allain, Marie-Laure & Boyer, Marcel & Kotchoni, Rachidi & Ponssard, Jean-Pierre, 2015. "Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 38-47.
    9. Leung, Charles Ka Yui & Ng, Joe Cho Yiu & Tang, Edward Chi Ho, 2019. "What do we know about Housing Supply? The case of Hong Kong," MPRA Paper 93510, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Marcel Canoy, 1994. "Natural monopoly and differential pricing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 287-309, October.
    11. Rupayan Pal & Vinay Ramani, 2017. "Will a matchmaker invite her potential rival in?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 806-819, December.
    12. Brennan, Timothy J., 2000. "The Economics of Competition Policy: Recent Developments and Cautionary Notes in Antitrust and Regulation," Discussion Papers 10716, Resources for the Future.
    13. Xuan Hoi Bui, 2021. "World Oil Crisis and its Impacts on the Petroleum Market and the Economy of Vietnam," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 11(2), pages 40-48.
    14. Uwe Dulleck, 2005. "WTO's Anti-dumping Rule and the Protection of Incumbents," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(2), pages 229-239.
    15. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-537, May.
    16. Christopher S. Yoo, 2017. "Avoiding the Pitfalls of Net Uniformity: Zero Rating and Nondiscrimination," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(4), pages 509-536, June.
    17. Federico Rotondo & Ludovico Marinò, 2016. "Extent and determinants of voluntary disclosure for regulatory purposes in the Italian airport industry," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 13(2), pages 157-177, May.
    18. Nestor Bruno, 2019. "Costos hundidos endógenos y competencia: aplicación al caso de telefonía local en EE.UU," Ensayos de Política Económica, Departamento de Investigación Francisco Valsecchi, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina., vol. 3(1), pages 37-57, Octubre.
    19. Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder, 2015. "Preventives Versus Treatments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(3), pages 1167-1239.
    20. Davide Vannoni, 2000. "The diversifield firm: non formal theories versus formal models," ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2000(106).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    barriers to potential competition; barriers to competitive fringe expansion; market power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:beo:journl:v:57:y:2012:i:195:p:103-114. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Goran Petrić (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/efbeoyu.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.