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Gender legislation in France: Empirical evidence from non-compliant firms

Author

Listed:
  • Ouidad Yousfi

    (Montpellier Research on Management MRM, University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France)

  • Nadia Loukil

    (ISG Bizerte, Université de Carthage & FCF LR, FSEG Tunis, Université Tunis-EL Manar, Tunisia)

Abstract

This paper studies non-compliant firms with gender legislation and why some businesses are taking the risk of not binding the gender quotas. It is conducted on firms listed on the SBF120 index, after the introduction of the gender law of Copé and Zimmermann, in 2011. Our findings show that gender diversity on advisory committees, unlike monitoring committees, is likely to decrease the non-compliance likelihood. Non-compliant firms have busy members, specifically among men and long-tenured CEOs who are serving in non-dual structures. Regarding women's profiles, non-compliant boards are prone to hire short-tenured and local female candidates. Finally, their financial and social performances are not damaged while their corporate risks are decreased. When penalties are not required against non-compliant firms, refractory businesses do not bear “real” costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Ouidad Yousfi & Nadia Loukil, 2025. "Gender legislation in France: Empirical evidence from non-compliant firms," Journal of Economic Analysis, Anser Press, vol. 4(1), pages 214-239, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bba:j00001:v:4:y:2025:i:1:p:214-239:d:363
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2007. "A Theory of Friendly Boards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 217-250, February.
    2. Réal Labelle & Claude Francoeur & Faten Lakhal, 2015. "To Regulate Or Not To Regulate? Early Evidence on the Means Used Around the World to Promote Gender Diversity in the Boardroom," Gender, Work and Organization, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 339-363, July.
    3. Hauser, Roie, 2018. "Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 16-37.
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