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Designing Collective Action: Problems of Local Water Management in Tiruchi District

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  • Lindberg, Staffan
  • Rajagopal, A.
  • Djurfeldt, Göran
  • Athreya, Venkatesh B.
  • Vidyasagar, R.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Lindberg, Staffan & Rajagopal, A. & Djurfeldt, Göran & Athreya, Venkatesh B. & Vidyasagar, R., 2011. "Designing Collective Action: Problems of Local Water Management in Tiruchi District," Review of Agrarian Studies, Foundation for Agrarian Studies, vol. 1(2), December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ragrar:308559
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.308559
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bardhan, Pranab, 2000. "Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(4), pages 847-865, July.
    2. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
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