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Konflikty o ziemię rolną – perspektywa ekonomiczna

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  • Milczarek-Andrzejewska, Dominika
  • Wilkin, Jerzy
  • Marks-Bielska, Renata
  • Czarnecki, Adam
  • Bartczak, Anna

Abstract

Agricultural land plays several functions; it is both an economic resource and a natural, cultural, and symbolic asset. The multifunctionality of agricultural land may, nevertheless, give rise to conflicts over its use and, as a result, generate significant economic costs. However, economists usually do not investigate conflicts. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The article focuses on methodological issues and outlines economic concepts that may be valuable to study land-use conflicts. Among the various approaches and theories that are important in the economic analysis of conflicts, special attention is paid to new institutional economics and public choice theory, which are often used by agricultural as well as environmental economists. The article highlights the importance of the institutional framework for a well-functioning land market. It concludes that economics can offer tools for studying conflicts by paying attention to the distinct interests and economic resources of different actors, as well as the relationship between present and future social needs. The paper also briefly reviews recent empirical research on landuse conflicts in Poland.

Suggested Citation

  • Milczarek-Andrzejewska, Dominika & Wilkin, Jerzy & Marks-Bielska, Renata & Czarnecki, Adam & Bartczak, Anna, 2020. "Konflikty o ziemię rolną – perspektywa ekonomiczna," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2020(4), December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:polgne:310153
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.310153
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    as
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    1. Milczarek-Andrzejewska, Dominika & Wilkin, Jerzy & Marks-Bielska, Renata & Czarnecki, Adam & Bartczak, Anna, 2020. "Konflikty o ziemię rolną – perspektywa ekonomiczna," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2020(4), December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Land Economics/Use;

    JEL classification:

    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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