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Der Halbteilungsgrundsatz als Verhandlungslösung für handelbare Zahlungsansprüche – Eine Analyse vor dem Hintergrund axiomatischer Verhandlungslösungen sowie der Focal Point theory

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  • Bahrs, E.

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  • Bahrs, E., 2006. "Der Halbteilungsgrundsatz als Verhandlungslösung für handelbare Zahlungsansprüche – Eine Analyse vor dem Hintergrund axiomatischer Verhandlungslösungen sowie der Focal Point theory," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 41, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:gewipr:259267
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.259267
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, October.
    2. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-550, May.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March.
    5. Isermeyer, Folkhard, 2003. "Umsetzung des Luxemburger Beschlusses zur EU-Agrarreform in Deutschland - eine erste Einschätzung," Arbeitsberichte aus der vTI-Agrarökonomie 03/2003, Johann Heinrich von Thünen Institute, Federal Research Institute for Rural Areas, Forestry and Fisheries.
    6. Murnighan, J Keith & Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 101-124, March.
    7. Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1983. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 362-372, June.
    8. H. Peyton Young & Mary A. Burke, 2001. "Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 559-573, June.
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