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Supply Function Competition in the Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market

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  • Aitor Ciarreta
  • Maria Paz Espinosa

Abstract

We represent the Spanish wholesale market as a supply function com­petition model. Theoretically, the larger generators’ supply curves for each plant should be to the left of the supply curves of plants owned by smaller generators. We test this prediction for fuel plants using data from the Spanish Market Op­erator (OMEL) from January 2002 to December 2005. Our empirical results are consistent with the model predictions and suggest that the supply function model better fits data than a discrete-bid auction model since large generators behave as price-makers irrespective whether they are the marginal firms at the auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Aitor Ciarreta & Maria Paz Espinosa, 2010. "Supply Function Competition in the Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 137-158.
  • Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:2010v31-04-a06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1998. "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 703-725, Winter.
    2. James B. Bushnell & Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, 2008. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 237-266, March.
    3. Par Holmberg, 2007. "Supply Function Equilibrium with Asymmetric Capacities and Constant Marginal Costs," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 55-82.
    4. Juan Delgado, 2006. "Coalition-proof supply function equilibria under capacity constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 219-229, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kamiński, Jacek, 2012. "The development of market power in the Polish power generation sector: A 10-year perspective," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 136-147.
    2. Arcos-Vargas, A. & Nuñez, F. & Román-Collado, R., 2020. "Short-term effects of PV integration on global welfare and CO2 emissions. An application to the Iberian electricity market," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    3. Mulder, Machiel & Petrikaitė, Vaiva & Scholtens, Bert, 2015. "Distributed energy generation techniques and the competitive fringe effect in electricity markets," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 125-140.
    4. Ciarreta, Aitor & Espinosa, Maria Paz & Pizarro-Irizar, Cristina, 2017. "Has renewable energy induced competitive behavior in the Spanish electricity market?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 171-182.
    5. Kamiński, Jacek, 2014. "A blocked takeover in the Polish power sector: A model-based analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 42-52.
    6. Victor F. Moutinho & António C. Moreira & João Paulo C. Bento, 2018. "Strategic decisions on bilateral bidding behavior: evidence from a wholesale electricity market," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 1353-1387, May.
    7. Rossetto, F. & Grossi, L. & Pollitt, M., 2019. "Assessing Market Power in the Italian Electricity Market: A synthetic supply approach," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1975, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2021. "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    9. Ciarreta, Aitor & Nasirov, Shahriyar & Silva, Carlos, 2016. "The development of market power in the Spanish power generation sector: Perspectives after market liberalization," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 700-710.
    10. Ciarreta, Aitor & Espinosa, María Paz, 2012. "The impact of regulation on pricing behavior in the Spanish electricity market (2002–2005)," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 2039-2045.
    11. Kamiński, Jacek, 2011. "Market power in a coal-based power generation sector: The case of Poland," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 6634-6644.
    12. Cristina Ballester & Dolores Furió, 2017. "Impact of Wind Electricity Forecasts on Bidding Strategies," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(8), pages 1-17, August.
    13. Espinosa Alejos, María Paz, 2013. "Understanding Tariff Deficit and its Challenges," DFAEII Working Papers 1988-088X, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
    14. Moutinho, Victor & Moreira, António C. & Mota, Jorge, 2014. "Do regulatory mechanisms promote competition and mitigate market power? Evidence from Spanish electricity market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 403-412.
    15. Paulo Cesar Coutinho & Andre Rossi de Oliveira, 2013. "Trading Forward in the Brazilian Electricity Market," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 3(3), pages 272-287.

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