The Single Transferable Vote
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.27
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References listed on IDEAS
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Aleksei Yu. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2018. "Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach," HSE Working papers WP BRP 194/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Sarwate Anand D. & Checkoway Stephen & Shacham Hovav, 2013. "Risk-limiting Audits and the Margin of Victory in Nonplurality Elections," Statistics, Politics and Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 29-64, January.
- Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998.
"Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 149-175, April.
- Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan, 1998. "Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 149-175, April.
- Diss, Mostapha & Mahajne, Muhammad, 2020.
"Social acceptability of Condorcet committees,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 14-27.
- Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne, 2019. "Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees," Working Papers halshs-02011732, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne, 2019. "Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees," Working Papers halshs-02003292, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne, 2019. "Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees," Working Papers 1906, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Aziz, Haris & Lee, Barton E., 2022.
"A characterization of proportionally representative committees,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 248-255.
- Haris Aziz & Barton E. Lee, 2020. "A characterization of proportionally representative committees," Papers 2002.09598, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
- Serhat Hasancebi, 2023. "The Maltese single transferable vote experience: a case study of gerrymandering?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 572-597, December.
- Mohajan, Haradhan, 2011. "Single transferable vote in local and national elections," MPRA Paper 50861, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Mar 2012.
- James Green-Armytage, 2015. "Direct voting and proxy voting," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 190-220, June.
- Salvatore Barbaro, 2021. "A social-choice perspective on authoritarianism and political polarization," Working Papers 2108, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
- Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & McBurney, Peter & Riley, Luke, 2019.
"Voting over a distributed ledger: An interdisciplinary perspective,"
CAGE Online Working Paper Series
416, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & McBurney, Peter & Riley, Luke, 2020. "Voting over a Distributed Ledger: An interdisciplinary perspective," SocArXiv 34df5, Center for Open Science.
- Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008.
"Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, September.
- Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2005. "Party formation in single-issue politics," Working Papers tecipa-174, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Adam Graham-Squire & Matthew I. Jones & David McCune, 2024. "New fairness criteria for truncated ballots in multi-winner ranked-choice elections," Papers 2408.03926, arXiv.org.
- Nicolaus Tideman & Daniel Richardson, 2000. "Better Voting Methods Through Technology: The Refinement-Manageability Trade-Off in the Single Transferable Vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 13-34, April.
- Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 187-210, April.
- Stensholt, Eivind, 2020. "Anomalies of Instant Runoff Voting," Discussion Papers 2020/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Eivind Stensholt, 2010.
"Voces populi and the art of listening,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 291-317, July.
- Stensholt, Eivind, 2008. "Voces Populi and the Art of Listening," Discussion Papers 2008/10, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Amrita Dhillon & Grammateia Kotsialou & Peter McBurney & Luke Riley, 2021. "Voting Over a Distributed Ledger: An Interdisciplinary Perspective," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 12(3), pages 200-268, September.
- Steven J. Brams & Markus Brill & Anne-Marie George, 2022.
"The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 283-300, February.
- Steven, Brams & Markus, Brill, 2018. "The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes," MPRA Paper 89739, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Haris Aziz & Barton E. Lee, 2020. "The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 1-45, January.
- Haris Aziz & Markus Brill & Vincent Conitzer & Edith Elkind & Rupert Freeman & Toby Walsh, 2017. "Justified representation in approval-based committee voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 461-485, February.
- Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004.
"Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, April.
- Murat R. Sertel & Remzi Sanver, 2001. "Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners," Working Papers 0107, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
- Dan Alger, 2006. "Voting by proxy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 1-26, January.
- James Green-Armytage & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2020. "Selecting the runoff pair," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 119-137, January.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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