IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v9y1995i1p27-38.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Single Transferable Vote

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolaus Tideman

Abstract

The single transferable vote (STV) is a family of vote-counting procedures that use voters' rankings of candidates as input and achieve proportional representation. This paper compares STV with other types of voting procedures and discusses the history of STV, issues concerning the rules of STV, limitations of various versions of STV, and a new version of STV based on paired comparisons of sets of candidates. Each refinement of STV overcomes a limitation of previous versions but at some cost in either the difficulty of understanding the procedure, the cost of computing the outcome, or both.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolaus Tideman, 1995. "The Single Transferable Vote," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 27-38, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:27-38
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.27
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.27
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    2. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    3. I. D. Hill, 1988. "Some Aspects of Elections — to Fill One Seat or Many," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 151(2), pages 243-261, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Aleksei Yu. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2018. "Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach," HSE Working papers WP BRP 194/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Sarwate Anand D. & Checkoway Stephen & Shacham Hovav, 2013. "Risk-limiting Audits and the Margin of Victory in Nonplurality Elections," Statistics, Politics and Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 29-64, January.
    3. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998. "Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 149-175, April.
    4. Diss, Mostapha & Mahajne, Muhammad, 2020. "Social acceptability of Condorcet committees," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 14-27.
    5. Aziz, Haris & Lee, Barton E., 2022. "A characterization of proportionally representative committees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 248-255.
    6. Serhat Hasancebi, 2023. "The Maltese single transferable vote experience: a case study of gerrymandering?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 572-597, December.
    7. Mohajan, Haradhan, 2011. "Single transferable vote in local and national elections," MPRA Paper 50861, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Mar 2012.
    8. James Green-Armytage, 2015. "Direct voting and proxy voting," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 190-220, June.
    9. Salvatore Barbaro, 2021. "A social-choice perspective on authoritarianism and political polarization," Working Papers 2108, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    10. Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & McBurney, Peter & Riley, Luke, 2019. "Voting over a distributed ledger: An interdisciplinary perspective," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 416, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    11. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, September.
    12. Adam Graham-Squire & Matthew I. Jones & David McCune, 2024. "New fairness criteria for truncated ballots in multi-winner ranked-choice elections," Papers 2408.03926, arXiv.org.
    13. Nicolaus Tideman & Daniel Richardson, 2000. "Better Voting Methods Through Technology: The Refinement-Manageability Trade-Off in the Single Transferable Vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 13-34, April.
    14. Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 187-210, April.
    15. Stensholt, Eivind, 2020. "Anomalies of Instant Runoff Voting," Discussion Papers 2020/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    16. Eivind Stensholt, 2010. "Voces populi and the art of listening," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 291-317, July.
    17. Amrita Dhillon & Grammateia Kotsialou & Peter McBurney & Luke Riley, 2021. "Voting Over a Distributed Ledger: An Interdisciplinary Perspective," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 12(3), pages 200-268, September.
    18. Steven J. Brams & Markus Brill & Anne-Marie George, 2022. "The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 283-300, February.
    19. Haris Aziz & Barton E. Lee, 2020. "The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 1-45, January.
    20. Haris Aziz & Markus Brill & Vincent Conitzer & Edith Elkind & Rupert Freeman & Toby Walsh, 2017. "Justified representation in approval-based committee voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 461-485, February.
    21. Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, April.
    22. Dan Alger, 2006. "Voting by proxy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 1-26, January.
    23. James Green-Armytage & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2020. "Selecting the runoff pair," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 119-137, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Spenkuch, Jörg, 2013. "On the Extent of Strategic Voting," MPRA Paper 50198, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy, 2020. "Agenda Control And Reciprocity In Sequential Voting Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(4), pages 1813-1829, October.
    3. Josheski Dushko & Karamazova Elena, 2021. "Auction theory and a note on game mechanisms," Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics, Sciendo, vol. 7(1), pages 43-59, May.
    4. Felix Brandt & Patrick Lederer & René Romen, 2024. "Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(1), pages 19-55, August.
    5. Alix-Garcia, Jennifer M. & Sims, Katharine R.E. & Phaneuf, Daniel J., 2019. "Using referenda to improve targeting and decrease costs of conditional cash transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 179-194.
    6. Bock, Hans-Hermann & Day, William H. E. & McMorris, F. R., 1998. "Consensus rules for committee elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 219-232, May.
    7. Fabian R. Pieroth & Martin Bichler, 2022. "$\alpha$-Rank-Collections: Analyzing Expected Strategic Behavior with Uncertain Utilities," Papers 2211.10317, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    8. Elkind, Edith & Grandi, Umberto & Rossi, Francesca & Slinko, Arkadii, 2020. "Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k-approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 193-205.
    9. Umut Keskin & M. Remzi Sanver & H. Berkay Tosunlu, 2021. "Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 125-141, January.
    10. ,, 2009. "Strategy-proofness and single-crossing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
    11. Ricardo Martínez & Bernardo Moreno, 2011. "Manipulability in Restricted Separable Domains," Working Papers 2011-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    12. Yuliya Veselova, 2016. "The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(3), pages 609-638, March.
    13. Marco LiCalzi, 2022. "Bipartite choices," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 45(2), pages 551-568, December.
    14. Gershkov, Alex & Kleiner, Andreas & Moldovanu, Benny & Shi, Xianwen, 2023. "Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 193-208.
    15. John C. McCabe-Dansted & Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "Exploratory Analysis of Similarities Between Social Choice Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 77-107, January.
    16. James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Siamak F. Shahandashti, 2016. "Electoral Systems Used around the World," Papers 1605.01343, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2016.
    18. Aravena, Claudia & Hutchinson, W. George & Carlsson, Fredrik & Matthews, David I, 2015. "Testing preference formation in learning design contingent valuation (LDCV) using advanced information and repetitivetreatments," Working Papers in Economics 619, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    19. Aleskerov, Fuad & Karabekyan, Daniel & Sanver, M. Remzi & Yakuba, Vyacheslav, 2012. "On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-73.
    20. Lirong Xia, 2020. "How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?," Papers 2011.03791, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:27-38. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.