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International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability

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  • Kenneth Rogoff

Abstract

This paper asks how recent developments in research on banking and sovereign lending can help inform the debate on choosing a new international financial architecture. A broad range of plans is considered, including a global lender of last resort facility, an international bankruptcy court, an international debt insurance corporation, and unilateral controls on capital flows. One common failing of the main plans that have been proposed is that they fail to confront the biases in the existing system towards debt finance and bank intermediation, at the expense of equity finance and direct investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:13:y:1999:i:4:p:21-42
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.13.4.21
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.13.4.21
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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