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Review of Grossman and Helpman's Special Interest Politics

Author

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  • David P. Baron

Abstract

In Special Interest Politics Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman examine how special-interest groups influence political outcomes for the benefit of their members. The authors take interest groups seriously by considering a range of theories and supporting evidence on interest group activity. Their book provides perspectives on how to study interest group politics and a set of methods for that study. Although the authors present a number of standard models, the book contains much that is new. The reader takes away a multitude of results, tools, models, and new research ideas. The result is an outstanding book full of insight, useful methods, and perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • David P. Baron, 2002. "Review of Grossman and Helpman's Special Interest Politics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1221-1229, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:40:y:2002:i:4:p:1221-1229
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/002205102762203611
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
    2. Diermeier, Daniel & Feddersen, Timothy J., 1998. "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 611-621, September.
    3. Bennedsen Morten & Feldmann Sven E., 2002. "Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-18, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jemio M., Luis Carlos & Candia C., Fernando & Evia V., José Luis, 2009. "Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1121, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Daniel T. Haile, 2005. "Wealth Distribution, Lobbying and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2005-21, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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