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Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining: Comment

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  • Catherine C. de Fontenay
  • Joshua S. Gans

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  • Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2003. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 448-455, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:448-455
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282803321455412
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ricardo J. Caballero & Mohamad L. Hammour, 1998. "The Macroeconomics of Specificity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 724-767, August.
    2. Asher Wolinsky, 2000. "A Theory of the Firm with Non-Binding Employment Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 875-910, July.
    3. Edward P. Lazear, 1984. "Raids and Offermatching," NBER Working Papers 1419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
    5. Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
    6. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marc-Andreas Muendler & Sascha O. Becker, 2010. "Margins of Multinational Labor Substitution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1999-2030, December.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Pol Antràs & Elhanan Helpman, 2007. "Contracts and Technology Adoption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 916-943, June.
    3. Seongwuk Moon, 2018. "Skill development, bargaining power, and a theory of job design," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 270-296, June.
    4. Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2005. "Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 544-572, Autumn.
    5. Dobbelaere, Sabien & Luttens, Roland Iwan, 2013. "The Economics of First-Contract Mediation," IZA Discussion Papers 7541, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Dicarlo, Emanuele, 2022. "How Do Firms Adjust to Negative Labor Supply Shocks? Evidence from Migration Outflows," IZA Discussion Papers 14994, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Sabien Dobbelaere & Roland Iwan Luttens, 2011. "Collective Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-041/3, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Monique Ebell & Christian Haefke, 2002. "Product market deregulation and labor market outcomes," Economics Working Papers 726, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2003.
    9. Frank Neffke, 2017. "Coworker Complementarity," SPRU Working Paper Series 2017-05, SPRU - Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School.
    10. Pio Baake & Vanessa Schlippenbach, 2014. "The Impact of Upfront Payments on Assortment Decisions in Retailing," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(1), pages 95-111, February.
    11. Emanuele Dicarlo, 2022. "How do firms adjust to a negative labor supply shock? Evidence form migration outflows," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1361, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    12. de Fontenay, Catherine C. & Gans, Joshua S., 2004. "Can vertical integration by a monopsonist harm consumer welfare?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 821-834, June.
    13. Stenbacka, Rune & Tombak, Mihkel, 2012. "Make and buy: Balancing bargaining power," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 391-402.

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