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Concentration Thresholds for Horizontal Mergers

Author

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  • Volker Nocke
  • Michael D. Whinston

Abstract

Concentration-based thresholds for horizontal mergers, such as those in the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, play a central role in merger analysis but their basis remains unclear. We show that there is both a theoretical and an empirical basis for focusing solely on the change in concentration, and ignoring its level, in screening mergers for whether their unilateral price effects will harm consumers. We also argue that current threshold levels likely are too lax, unless one expects efficiency gains of 5 percent or greater, or other factors such as entry and product repositioning to significantly constrain the exercise of market power postmerger.

Suggested Citation

  • Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, 2022. "Concentration Thresholds for Horizontal Mergers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(6), pages 1915-1948, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:112:y:2022:i:6:p:1915-48
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201038
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Fioretti & Junnan He & Jorge Tamayo, 2024. "Prices and Concentration: A U-Shape? Theory and Evidence from Renewables," Working Papers hal-04631762, HAL.
    2. Rabah Arezki & Ana Margarida Fernandes & Federico Merchán & Ha Nguyen & Tristan Reed, 2021. "Natural Resource Dependence and Monopolized Imports," CESifo Working Paper Series 9254, CESifo.
    3. Louis Kaplow, 2024. "The 2023 Merger Guidelines and Market Definition: Doubling Down or Folding?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(1), pages 7-37, August.
    4. Ince, Baris, 2024. "How do regulatory costs affect mergers and acquisitions decisions and outcomes?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    5. Keith N. Hylton, 2024. "Getting Merger Guidelines Right," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(1), pages 213-241, August.
    6. Andrea Batch & Benjamin R. Bridgman & Abe C. Dunn & Mahsa Gholizadeh, 2023. "Consumption Zones," BEA Papers 0114, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
    7. Mansley, Ryan & Miller, Nathan H. & Sheu, Gloria & Weinberg, Matthew C., 2023. "A price leadership model for merger analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    8. Paul S. Koh, 2024. "Concentration-Based Inference for Evaluating Horizontal Mergers," Papers 2407.12924, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    9. Javier D. Donna & Pedro Pereira, 2024. "Structural Presumptions for Non-horizontal Mergers in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Primer and a Path Forward," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(1), pages 303-345, August.
    10. Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Tim Friehe, 2024. "Product Liability Influences Incentives for Horizontal Mergers," EconomiX Working Papers 2024-10, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    11. repec:bea:wpaper:0208 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Suguru Otani & Takuma Matsuda, 2023. "Unified Merger List in the Container Shipping Industry from 1966 to 2022: A Structural Estimation of M&A Matching," Papers 2310.09938, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
    13. Zhu, Jialiang & Gu, Jinnan, 2024. "Intensified law enforcement and firm innovation: Evidence from China's antitrust consolidation," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    14. Sato, Susumu, 2024. "Conflict between consumer and worker surpluses under monopoly power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    15. Haucap, Justus & Stiebale, Joel, 2023. "Non-price effects of mergers and acquisitions," DICE Discussion Papers 402, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    16. Steven C. Salop, 2024. "The 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian Integration," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(1), pages 79-128, August.
    17. FUKASAWA Takeshi & OHASHI Hiroshi, 2023. "Long-run Effect of a Horizontal Merger and Its Remedial Standards," Discussion papers 23001, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    18. Carl Shapiro, 2024. "Evolution of the Merger Guidelines: Is This Fox Too Clever by Half?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(1), pages 147-175, August.
    19. Lancieri, Filippo Maria & Valleti, Tommaso, 2024. "Towards an effective merger review policy: A defence of rebuttable structural presumptions," Working Papers 345, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    20. Kiriti Kanjilal & Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2024. "Strategic Merger Approvals Under Incomplete Information," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(3), pages 759-791, November.
    21. Paul S. Koh, 2024. "Market Definition: A Sensitivity Analysis," Papers 2407.12774, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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