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From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws

Author

Listed:
  • Gabriele Gratton
  • Luigi Guiso
  • Claudio Michelacci
  • Massimo Morelli

Abstract

With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriele Gratton & Luigi Guiso & Claudio Michelacci & Massimo Morelli, 2021. "From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(9), pages 2964-3003, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:9:p:2964-3003
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190672
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ash, Elliott & Morelli, Massimo & Vannoni, Matia, 2022. "More Laws, More Growth? Evidence from U.S. States," CEPR Discussion Papers 15629, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Gabriele Gratton & Massimo Morelli, 2022. "Optimal Checks And Balances Under Policy Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 549-569, May.
    3. Ufuk Akcigit & Salomé Baslandze & Francesca Lotti, 2023. "Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(2), pages 529-564, March.
    4. Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti & Javier Quintana & Isabel Soler & Rok Spruk, 2024. "The heterogenous effects of a higher volume of regulation: evidence from more than 200k Spanish norms," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 137-153, June.
    5. Dana Foarta & Massimo Morelli, 2022. "Complexity and the Reform Process: The Role of Delegated Policymaking," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22180, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Emery Thomas J. & Kovac Mitja & Spruk Rok, 2023. "Estimating the Effects of Political Instability in Nascent Democracies," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 243(6), pages 599-642, December.
    7. Gratton, Gabriele & Morelli, Massimo, 2020. "Optimal Checks and Balances Under Policy Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 14745, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Gabriele Gratton & Barton E. Lee, 2023. "Drain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism," Discussion Papers 2023-02, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    9. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    10. Dana Foarta, 2021. "How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21156, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti & Laura Hospido & Andrés Atienza-Maeso, 2024. "Is Equality Regulation Effective in Reducing Gender Gaps in the Labor Market? Quantification and Evidence for Spain," Working papers 943, Banque de France.
    12. Baslandze, Salomé, 2021. "Barriers to Creative Destruction: Large Firms and Non-Productive Strategies," CEPR Discussion Papers 16570, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Dana Foarta, 2021. "How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21156, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    14. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2023. "The bureaucracy trap," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
      • Ascensión Andina-Díaz & Francesco Feri & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2022. "The Bureaucracy Trap," Working Papers 2022-03, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    15. Foarta, Dana & Ting, Michael M., 2023. "Organizational Capacity and Project Dynamics," Research Papers 4069, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    16. Bartolozzi, D. & Gara, M. & Marchetti, D.J. & Masciandaro, D., 2022. "Designing the anti-money laundering supervisor: The governance of the financial intelligence units," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1093-1109.
    17. Zhao, Da & Yu, Ao & Guo, Jingyuan, 2022. "Judicial institutions, local protection and market segmentation: Evidence from the establishment of interprovincial circuit tribunals in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    18. Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti & Javier Quintana & Isabel Soler & Rok Spruk, 2023. "Sector-level economic effects of regulatory complexity: evidence from Spain," Working Papers 2312, Banco de España.
    19. Sasso, Greg & Morelli, Massimo, 2021. "Bureaucrats under Populism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    20. Luca Bellodi & Massimo Morelli & Matia Vannoni, 2021. "The Costs of Populism for the Bureaucracy and Government Performance: Evidence from Italian Municipalities," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21158, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    21. Lucy Martin & Pia J. Raffler, 2021. "Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 210-224, January.
    22. Foarta, Dana & Morelli, Massimo, 2022. "The Common Determinants of Legislative and Regulatory Complexity," Research Papers 4068, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    23. Li, Aimin, 2024. "Judicial local protection and corporate litigation outcomes: A study based on legal big data," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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