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Job Matching under Constraints

Author

Listed:
  • Fuhito Kojima
  • Ning Sun
  • Ning Neil Yu

Abstract

Studying job matching in a Kelso-Crawford framework, we consider arbitrary constraints imposed on sets of doctors that a hospital can hire. We characterize all constraints that preserve the substitutes condition (for all revenue functions that satisfy the substitutes condition), a critical condition on hospitals' revenue functions for well-behaved competitive equilibria. A constraint preserves the substitutes condition if and only if it is a "generalized interval constraint," which specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of hired doctors, forces some hires, and forbids others. Additionally, "generalized polyhedral constraints" are precisely those that preserve the substitutes condition for all "group separable" revenue functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Fuhito Kojima & Ning Sun & Ning Neil Yu, 2020. "Job Matching under Constraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2935-2947, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:9:p:2935-47
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190780
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kazuo Murota, 2016. "Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 151-273, December.
    2. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2009. "A Double-Track Adjustment Process for Discrete Markets With Substitutes and Complements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(3), pages 933-952, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Serial Vickrey Mechanism," ISER Discussion Paper 1095, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Yokote, Koji, 2021. "Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    3. Ce Liu & Ziwei Wang & Hanzhe Zhang, 2023. "Self-Enforced Job Matching," Papers 2308.13899, arXiv.org.
    4. Yokote, Koji, 2023. "A critical comparison between the gross substitutes and complements conditions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    5. Oguzhan Celebi, 2023. "Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action and Choice Rules," Papers 2310.14442, arXiv.org.
    6. Hafalir, Isa E. & Kojima, Fuhito & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2022. "Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    7. Devansh Jalota & Michael Ostrovsky & Marco Pavone, 2022. "Matching with Transfers under Distributional Constraints," Papers 2202.05232, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    8. Chao Huang, 2022. "Firm-worker hypergraphs," Papers 2211.06887, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations

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