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Endogenous Entry to Security-Bid Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Takeharu Sogo
  • Dan Bernhardt
  • Tingjun Liu

Abstract

We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any minimum reserve security-bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset's value when retained by the seller. DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues.

Suggested Citation

  • Takeharu Sogo & Dan Bernhardt & Tingjun Liu, 2016. "Endogenous Entry to Security-Bid Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3577-3589, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:11:p:3577-89
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151538
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2005. "Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 936-959, September.
    2. Shimon Kogan & John Morgan, 2010. "Securities Auctions under Moral Hazard: An Experimental Study," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 14(3), pages 477-520.
    3. repec:bla:jfinan:v:55:y:2000:i:4:p:1807-1854 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Liu, Tingjun, 2016. "Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 94-123.
    5. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2010. "Bidding with Securities: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1929-1935, September.
    6. Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, 2011. "Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1806-1841, August.
    7. Narayanan, M. P., 1988. "Debt versus Equity under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 39-51, March.
    8. Abhishek, Vineet & Hajek, Bruce & Williams, Steven R., 2015. "On bidding with securities: Risk aversion and positive dependence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 66-80.
    9. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:1:p:41-57 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2013. "Auctions with contingent payments — An overview," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 666-675.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tingjun Liu & Dan Bernhardt, 2021. "Rent Extraction with Securities Plus Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1869-1912, August.
    2. Wenjun Wang, 2023. "Can experience mitigate precautionary bidding? Evidence from a quasi-experiment at an IPO auction," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 24(2), pages 148-163, March.
    3. Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2023. "Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 815-851.
    4. Bernhardt, Dan & Liu, Tingjun & Sogo, Takeharu, 2020. "Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    5. Lin William Cong, 2020. "Timing of Auctions of Real Options," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(9), pages 3956-3976, September.
    6. Lam, Wing Tung, 2020. "Inefficient sorting under output sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    7. Andrés Fioriti & Allan Hernandez-Chanto, 2022. "Leveling the Playing Field for Risk-Averse Agents in Security-Bid Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5441-5463, July.
    8. Diego Carrasco-Novoa & Allan Hernández-Chanto, 2022. "Competing Sellers in Security-Bid Auctions under Risk-Averse Bidders," Discussion Papers Series 655, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    9. Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Fioriti, Andres, 2019. "Bidding securities in projects with negative externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 14-36.
    10. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 99463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Sun, Wuqin & Wang, Dazhong & Zhang, Yue, 2018. "Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 57-66.
    12. Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019. "Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    13. Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2021. "Financing Skilled Labor," CEPR Discussion Papers 15751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Agastya, Murali & Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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