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Mandated Risk Retention in Mortgage Securitization: An Economist's View

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  • Paul Willen

Abstract

I evaluate the empirical premise and the economic logic of the Dodd-Frank Act's requirement that issuers of asset-backed securities retain credit risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Willen, 2014. "Mandated Risk Retention in Mortgage Securitization: An Economist's View," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 82-87, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:82-87
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.82
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    2. Christopher L. Foote & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2012. "Why did so many people make so many ex post bad decisions? the causes of the foreclosure crisis," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2012-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    3. Kristopher Gerardi & Andreas Lehnert & Shane M. Sherlund & Paul Willen, 2008. "Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(2 (Fall)), pages 69-159.
    4. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
    5. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(2), pages 229-264.
    6. Ing-Haw Cheng & Sahil Raina & Wei Xiong, 2014. "Wall Street and the Housing Bubble," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2797-2829, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jesper Berg & Morten Bækmand Nielsen & James Vickery, 2018. "Peas in a pod? Comparing the U.S. and Danish mortgage finance systems," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 24-3, pages 63-87.
    2. W. Scott Frame, 2018. "Agency Conflicts In Residential Mortgage Securitization: What Does The Empirical Literature Tell Us?," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 41(2), pages 237-251, June.
    3. Reher, Michael, 2021. "Finance and the supply of housing quality," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 357-376.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

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